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“Macroprudential policies focus on risks to the financial system as a 
whole. Such risks may be crosscutting, affecting a number of firms and 
markets, or they may be concentrated in a few key areas. A 
macroprudential approach would complement and build on the current 
regulatory and supervisory structure, in which the primary focus is the 
safety and soundness of individual institutions and markets.” 1 
 
This article addresses whether the implementation of new 
macroprudential reform policy can work to control systemic risk across the 
capital and financial markets given the current regulatory infrastructure in 
the U.S.  The passage of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (Reform Act) signaled a major change in the current regulatory and 
supervisory infrastructure from a microprudential model to a “big picture” 
or macroprudential approach to systemic risk in two significant ways.  
First, while addressing systemic risk has historically been within the realm 
of financial or prudential regulation, the new paradigm of macroprudential 
policy expands prudential regulation into the securities markets as a new 
stop gap measure to control “crosscutting” systemic risk.  Second, the 
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 1.  Benjamin Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Res. Bank, Financial Reform to Address 
Systemic Risk, Address to the Council on Foreign Relations, (March 10, 2009) (emphasis 
added), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernake/20090310a.htm 
 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090310a.htm. 
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Reform Act also creates a hybrid reform model designed to wed the new 
macroprudential systemic risk management policy, under the oversight of a 
super regulator, with the current supervisory “functional oversight” model 
implemented by existing federal agencies.  The article focuses on whether 
the hybrid reform model will work given the limitations and weaknesses of 
the current regulatory infrastructure upon which it is built.  To address this 
question, the article examines four federal agencies responsible for 
supervising some material aspect of financial transactions in the securities 
and banking sectors.  Understanding the U.S model offers a ground for 
comparison with similar macroprudential policies recently implemented in 
other global financial markets. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Glass–Steagall Act of 19332 provided for the separation of 
commercial and investment banking as part of the 1933 Banking Act.3  The 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, also known as the Financial Modernization 
Services Act of 1999,4 repealed part of Glass-Steagall, removing barriers in 
the market among banking companies, securities companies, and insurance 
companies that prohibited any one institution from acting as any 
combination of an investment bank, a commercial bank, and an insurance 
company.5  The change was viewed as a welcome deregulation of the 
banking and financial services market.  The theory was that the market is 
the best possible facilitator of economic coordination and rationality, even 
superior to central planning and regulation.  Deregulation became the 
mantra of global capital markets in the race to become more competitive in 
global financial centers.6 
 
 2.  The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). 
 3.  The Glass-Steagall Act technically refers to two separate federal laws: the Glass-
Steagall Act of 1932 and the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, the latter known as the Banking 
Act of 1933.  See  J. Gorman, General Counsel, Conference of State Bank Examiners, 
Summary of Provisions, (2012), available at 
http://www.csbs.org/bankinglaw101/BL101%20PDF/Glass-Steagall_Act.pdf.  (describing 
how the Act “effectively separated commercial banking from investment banking”); The 
1933 Act “also amended the Federal Reserve Act to institute the system of federal deposit 
insurance on a temporary basis, and created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(“FDIC”).”  Id. 
 4.  The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. 
L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6801 et seq.). 
 5.  The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Summary of Provisions, 
http://www.banking.senate.gov/conf/grmleach.htm. 
 6.  See generally PETER KOSLOWSKI, THE ETHICS OF BANKING: CONCLUSIONS FROM 
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 167-76 (Springer ed., 2010). 
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The dominance of deregulation greatly facilitated the recent financial 
crisis and the trillion dollar bailouts of the banking and financial services 
system.7  The resulting destruction of capital through big bank deregulation 
has had enormous political, economic, and social consequences.  The 
singular consequence examined in this article focuses on the change in the 
regulatory and supervisory model aimed at the banking and securities 
markets in an effort to ease systemic risk and prevent future melt downs.8  
Specifically, the article examines the movement from microprudential 
regulation to macroprudential regulation,9 not only in the banking and 
financial services market but also in the extension of the model to the 
securities market in an effort to address the threat of “crosscutting” 
systemic risk. 
This idea of integrating prudential or financial risk regulation into the 
securities laws is relatively new and mostly untested.10  Securities 
regulation has traditionally focused on securing market efficiency and 
preserving the trust and confidence of investors in the marketplace, 
whereas regulatory monitoring of prudential systemic risk has been 
confined to financial sector regulators and done at a microprudential 
level.11 
The specific question to be addressed is whether the new model of 
macroprudential regulation, envisioned by the Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (Reform Act),12 can successfully interface with 
the actual regulatory apparatus in place.  The answer to the question lies to 
a great degree in understanding how the U.S. regulatory system works.  
The issue here is not one of design, but rather the probable success of 
agency implementation. 
Systemic risk has been defined as, “the potential for the financial 
 
 7.  Id. at 167. 
 8.  “The idea that macroprudential policy is needed to correct market failures, rather 
than to smooth financial cycles is important. . . . The identification and correction of market 
failures is a clearer, uncontroversial objective for a macroprudential regulator.”  Giovanni 
Favara & Lev Ratnovski, Macroprudential Policy: Economic Rationale and Optimal Tools, 
VOX (Aug. 6, 2012), 
http://www.voxeu.org/article/macroprudential-policy-economic-rationale-and-optimal-tools. 
 9.  See Claudio Borio, Towards a Macroprudential Framework for Financial 
Supervision and Regulation, 49 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 181 (2003) (providing in-depth 
finance discussion regarding the distinction between microprudential and macroprudential 
models of regulation). 
 10.  See Anita I. Anand, Is Systemic Risk Relevant to Securities Regulation?, 60 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 941, 942 (2010) [hereinafter Anand] (stating that very few countries have 
integrated systemic risk into their securities laws). 
 11.  Id. at 943. 
 12.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Reform Act]. 
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distress of a particular firm or group of firms to trigger broad spillover 
effects in financial markets, further triggering wrenching dislocations that 
affect broad economic performance.”13 
By analogy, systemic risk can be thought of as an illness that becomes 
uncontrollably contagious.14 “Crosscutting” systemic risk can be described 
as a risk of default by one market participant that will have repercussions 
on other market participants in different markets due to the interlocking 
nature of financial markets both domestically and globally.15 
The passage of the Reform Act, aimed at addressing systemic risk, 
signaled a major change in the current regulatory and supervisory 
infrastructure from a microprudential model to a “big picture” or 
macroprudential approach in two significant ways.16  First, while 
addressing systemic risk has historically been within the realm of financial 
or prudential regulation, the new paradigm of macroprudential policy 
expands prudential regulation into the securities markets as a new stop gap 
measure to control “crosscutting” systemic risk.17  Second, the Reform Act 
also creates a hybrid reform model designed to wed the new 
macroprudential systemic risk management policy, under the oversight of a 
super regulator, with the current supervisory “functional oversight” model 
implemented by existing federal agencies.18  Chairman Bernanke recently 
observed, regarding the relative benefits of this hybrid model, that “[b]oth 
regulation and market discipline have important roles to play in 
constraining risk-taking in financial markets; the best outcomes are 
 
 13.  Emil Henry, Assistant Secretary for Treasury for Financial Services, U.S. Treasury, 
Address Before the House Policy Council of the Financial Services Roundtable (June 26, 
2006), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/js4338.aspx. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  CHRISTOPHER LAURSEN ET AL., , PCI WHITE PAPER, WHY TOO BIG TO FAIL IS TOO 
SHORT SIGHTED TO SUCCEED: PROBLEMS WITH RELIANCE ON FIRM SIZE FOR SYSTEMIC RISK 
DETERMINATION,  (2010), 
http://www.pciaa.net/web/sitehome.nsf/lcpublic/379/$file/pci_whitepaper_toobigtofail.pdf 
 16.  See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Res. Bank, Address Before 47th Annual 
Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, Chicago, Ill. Conference on Bank Structure 
and Competition (May 5, 2011) [hereinafter Bernanke] (highlighting the changes and goals 
of the Reform Act). 
 17.  See Letter from Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Res. Bank, to Bob Corker, U.S. 
Senator (Oct. 30, 2009) (discussing the new paradigm for addressing systemic risk); See 
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Res. Bank, Address Before 2012 Federal Reserve Bank of 
Atlanta Financial Markets Conference, Stone Mountain Georgia (April 9, 2012) (explaining 
the government’s overhaul of the financial system and how it takes systemic risk into 
account). 
 18.  Annette Nazareth, New Paradigms for Financial Regulation in the United States 
and the European Union, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 845, 847 (2010) [hereinafter Nazareth]. 
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achieved when these two forms of oversight work effectively together.”19 
 
I. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN FINANCE THEORY AND LEGAL 
REGULATION 
The Reform Act effectively integrates finance theory and the law but 
not much is written about that process.  The connection between 
macroprudential policy and regulatory implementation is clear given that 
the failure of credible regulatory oversight in the regulatory and 
supervisory infrastructure is recognized as one major contributing factor to 
the rise of systemic risk.20  Thus, it is difficult to understand the new vision 
of regulatory reform in the marketplace brought about by the Reform Act 
without first understanding the underlying finance and economic theories 
that explain the new direction of the law.21  However, current literature fails 
to address the important question of whether new financial reform is indeed 
in lockstep with the existing regulatory infrastructure needed to implement 
its goal of stabilizing the market economy.  Arguably, the success of 
financial reform depends in great measure upon the actual legal authority of 
regulators to implement real economic reforms.  The analysis of the four 
federal agencies below illustrates that it is a mistake to assume that such 
broad legal authority resides with the regulators. 
A. Implementation of the Financial Model 
An economic study by Hanson, Kashyap & Stein, focusing on the 
model of macroprudential regulation, addresses the financial crisis in 
private sector banking institutions and how the movement from 
microprudential regulation to a new regulatory paradigm of 
macroprudential regulation could better control systemic risk.22  In 
 
 19.  Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Res. Bank, Remarks at the Squam Lake 
Conference, Remarks on “ The Squam Lake Report: Fixing the F inancial System” (June 
16, 2010), available at  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100616a.htm. 
 20.  David Lieberg & Michaela Posch, Macroprudential Regulation and Supervision: 
From the Identification of Systemic Risk to Policy Measures, FIN. STABILITY REP., June 
2011, at 68, http://www.oenb.at/en/img/fsr_21_special_topic_02_tcm16-235512.pdf 
[hereinafter Lieberg & Posch]. 
 21.  See generally Bernanke, supra note 16 (discussing the goals and reasoning behind 
reform regulation). 
 22.  Samuel G. Hanson, Annil K. Kashyap, & Jeremy C. Stein, A Macroprudential 
Approach to Financial Regulation, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2011), available at 
http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.25.1.3 [hereinafter Hanson et al.]. 
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expanding the “field of vision” from safety- and-soundness regulations that 
focus on individual financial institutions in isolation to the financial market 
as a whole, Hanson, Kashyap and Stein argue that specific changes to 
monetary policy and capital requirements can ease systemic risk.23  At the 
conclusion of the article, the authors pose a critical but unanswered 
question “about how such regulation might be implemented.”24  Noting that 
macroprudential oversight has been delegated to large councils populated 
by the heads of many diverse regulatory agencies such as the Financial 
Stability Oversight Committee (FSOC), a creature of the new Reform Act, 
and the European Systemic Risk Board, the article asks whether the 
existing weaknesses in the regulatory system itself can be addressed 
“sensibly.”25  The concern is not isolated.  For example, Davis and Karim 
worry that new regulation does not merely lead to substitution capital flows 
toward the remaining unregulated or less regulated sectors.26  Milne 
cautions that it is necessary to grasp not only the new contours of 
macroprudential policy (envisioned by the UK Financial Services 
Authority), but also how those new policies will be implemented to achieve 
the intended reform objectives.27 
Thus, the Hanson, Kashyap & Stein article leaves open two important 
albeit unanswered questions.28  First, is macroprudential regulation merely 
a function of shifting the focus from a particular banking institution in 
isolation to the financial market as a whole, or is the new model of 
macroprudential regulation, as envisioned by the Reform Act, a regulatory 
model that expands the field of vision to include both the financial and 
capital markets?  In short, what are the parameters of macroprudential 
reforms?  The second unanswered question is whether a macroprudential 
reform model can be successfully implemented in the U.S. based upon 
limitations in the current regulatory infrastructure? 
B. Credible Regulatory Oversight 
The second unanswered question was partially addressed in 
Weismann’s article, which specifically focuses on how to achieve credible 
regulatory oversight, given the current U.S. regulatory apparatus that 
 
 23.  Id. at 4. 
 24.  Id. at 23. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Phillip Davis, & Diruba Karim, Macroprudential Regulation - The Missing Policy 
Pillar, 211 NAT’L INST. ECON. REV.,   11 (2010), http://ner.sagepub.com/content/211/1/67. 
 27.  Alstair Milne, Macroprudential Policy: What Can It Achieve?, 25 OXFORD REV. OF 
ECON. POL’Y 608, 611 (2009) [hereinafter Milne]. 
 28.  See Hanson et al., supra note 22 (discussing macroprudential regulation). 
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provides meaningful control of a nation’s financial infrastructure and at the 
same time preserves innovation and growth in the marketplace.29  
Weismann observes that the oversight question is generally framed in terms 
of identifying a corporate or market disaster and then reflecting upon what 
factors are needed to make oversight work.30  However, this framing 
usually is “without any real understanding of the boundaries of regulatory 
authority and the systemic problems impacting the probable success of 
oversight.”31  While a valuable exercise in scholarship, its shortcoming is 
comparable to trying to fix a watch without first understanding all of the 
moving parts.32  The article then examines several questions in the context 
of the current regulatory structure, including: What is regulatory oversight? 
How does regulation work? What is the actual legal jurisdiction of the 
regulatory agencies in the financial sector?  What is the standard for 
determining whether the oversight exercised by a particular federal agency 
is “credible”?  Who makes the decisions in government, if anyone?  Given 
the current slow pace of passing enabling regulations, does the new Reform 
Act signal real change in financial oversight?33 
C. Integrating Theory and Practice to Achieve Reform 
To determine whether the new macroprudential reform model can be 
successfully implemented in the U.S. given its current domestic regulatory 
infrastructure, four federal agencies, responsible for supervising material 
aspects of financial transactions in the securities and banking sectors, are 
considered, including: the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC); Federal Reserve Board 
 
 29.  See Miriam F. Weismann, Achieving the goal of ‘credible’ regulatory oversight, 15 
J. LEGAL ETHICAL AND REGUL. ISSUES 1, 1 (2012) [hereinafter Weismann] (focusing on “the 
difficult and unresolved question of how to achieve credible regulatory oversight that 
provides meaningful control of the nations’ financial infrastructure and at the same time 
preserves innovation and growth in the marketplace”). 
 30.  Id. at 3. 
 31.  Id.  
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Weismann concludes: “In short, it is  fair  to  conclude  that  law  makers,  
regulators  and  the  private  sector, ostensibly in partnership with the regulators, must all 
accept responsibility for the current state of the financial markets.  However, this should not 
become just an exercise in assessing blame.  Instead, the goal should be to focus on 
accountability for the failure of the regulatory system to identify systemic risk. The 
Reform Act, like SOX before it, is reactive legislation enacted not only to solve this 
nagging problem of achieving financial stability in the marketplace but also to send a 
remedial message in the hope of coaxing ‘gun-shy’ investors back into the markets.” Id. at 
45.  The article then suggests several regulatory drafting “best practices” to increase the 
level of credible oversight.  Id. at 42. 
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(FRB); and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).  The 
important changes made by the Reform Act, including the creation of the 
umbrella regulator the FSOC34 to implement the new macroprudential 
policy, is likewise considered in this context. 
The regulatory analysis first considers whether a particular agency has 
operated in compliance with its congressional mandate in accordance with 
the agency’s regulatory model.  Several conclusions about oversight are 
provided based upon the relative success or failure of a particular agency’s 
oversight activities.  Then, changes to the respective agency’s authority and 
jurisdiction implemented by the Reform Act are also reviewed.  Finally, the 
article concludes that achieving the goal of credible oversight and reform 
through the implementation of macroprudential policy reform is 
complicated and cannot be cured simply by piling on more rules and 
regulations.  Even achieving a baseline of credible supervision under 
macroprudential reforms may not necessarily result in credible oversight.  
Inadequate regulatory oversight embraces a multitude of external 
deficiencies, including a lack of resources, an agency’s lack of focus, 
pressure from outside political forces, legal and policy limitations on 
agency authority, regulatory gaps created by policy decisions, and 
concealment of dishonest business practices in the private sector.  These 
externalities directly impact the probable success of implementing the 
macroprudential model of systemic risk management embedded in the 
Reform Act in the domestic and global venues currently considering the 
problem. 
II. UNDERSTANDING THE MACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATORY 
MODEL: A HYBRID BY DESIGN 
A. Macroprudential Regulation: A Hybrid Model 
The new model of regulatory policy and oversight envisioned by the 
Reform Act is a hybrid between the existing regulatory structure, referred 
to as “functional regulation,” and macroprudential systemic risk 
management, addressing both crosscutting risks and risks that flow across 
 
 34.  See generally, EDWARD V. MURPHY AND MICHAEL B. BERNIER, CRS REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL: A FRAMEWORK TO MITIGATE 
SYSTEMIC RISK, R42083 (2011), available at 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R42083_20111115.pdf (describing the purpose and scope of 
the FSOC).  The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) was created by the Reform 
Act as part of a comprehensive reform of the banking and securities market regulators.  Id.  
The FSOC both monitors systemic risk in the financial system and coordinates several 
federal financial regulators.  Id. 
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multiple markets.35  Financial experts tend to agree that systemic risk 
regulation and functional regulation “are closely interconnected and highly 
complementary.”36  Separation of systemic risk regulation and functional 
regulation creates a risk that nether performs satisfactorily in isolation.37 
There are, however, several variants of the macroprudential risk 
management model.  Indeed, a clear consensus on the definition, 
parameters and focus of macroprudential regulation has yet to be reached.38 
Generally, macroprudential policy has been defined as the “use of 
regulatory and other instruments to reduce the risk of financial 
instability.”39  In the case of the Reform Act, the new paradigm of systemic 
risk regulation is broadly designed, blurring the traditional distinction 
between financial and securities markets regulation and joins the two in a 
more unified system of supervision.40  Instead of focusing on components 
of the financial system, macroprudential policy addresses the system as a 
whole and, in conjunction with microprudential regulation and supervision, 
is gauged to achieve financial stability.41 
One main feature of macroprudential regulation in the global financial 
services industry has been an effort to control the social costs associated 
with economic downturns and excessive balance sheet shrinkage on the 
part of multiple financial institutions facing a common shock.42  Federal 
 
 35.  Nazareth, supra note 18, at 847; Weismann, supra note 29, at 8. 
 36.  Nazareth, supra note 18, at 847. 
 37.  See generally Bruce Arnold et al., Systemic Risk, Macroprudential Policy 
Frameworks, Monitoring Systems and the Evolution of Capital Adequacy, 36 J. BANK. & 
FIN. 3125, 3125-32 (2012)(discussing systemic risk’s advancement, measurement and 
implementation difficulties as a result of policy reform). 
 38.  Id. at 3126; Lieberg & Posch, supra note 20, at 68. 
 39.  Milne, supra note 27, at 611. 
 40.  Bernanke, supra note 16. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  See generally, BANK OF ENGLAND, THE ROLE OF MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY (2009), 
available at  
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/other/financialstability/roleofmac
roprudentialpolicy091121.pdf (“Whatever its structure, the prudential regulatory framework 
will need to be re-oriented to have a system-wide focus.  And improvements need to be 
made to allow financial institutions to fail without imposing unacceptable costs on the rest 
of society.”); Stephen Cecchetti, Econ. Adviser and Head of Monetary and Econ. Dep’t, 
Bank for Int’l Settlements (BIS), Remarks Prepared for the Second Conference of the 
European System of Central Banks: The Future of Financial Intermediation and Regulation, 
(Oct. 30, 2012), available at http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp121030.pdf (“As recent events 
have shown yet again, the fundamental links between the real economy and the financial 
system make it difficult if not impossible, to isolate the former from shocks originating in 
the latter . . . the reason to proscribe certain activities, to constrain certain actions, and to 
require certain behaviors is to not to protect individuals from facing the consequences of 
their own actions.  Rather, it is to keep the negligence, miscalculations, and errors of one 
individual or institution from affecting the system as a whole”). 
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Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, recognizing that such adverse shocks 
and systemic risk may be crosscutting, namely, risk affecting a number of 
firms and markets, concluded that macroprudential regulatory reforms 
should extend beyond the financial markets into the securities markets as 
well.43  The crosscutting effect is likewise a global concern.44  As noted 
previously, securities regulation has traditionally focused on securing 
market efficiency and preserving the trust and confidence of investors. On 
the other hand, regulatory monitoring of prudential systemic risk has been 
confined to financial sector regulators and done at a microprudential level. 
This notable separation between microprudential regulatory goals for the 
financial and securities markets is also common in other developed 
economies in the world.45 It is the movement from microprudential 
regulation to macroprudential regulation46 and its integration with the 
current U.S. regulatory system of functional regulation that has created 
complexity and challenges in implementing the Reform Act. 
B. Functional Regulation 
The oversight model of “functional regulation” remains relatively 
unchanged by the Reform Act.47 This regulatory system embraces both the 
banking sector and the securities and futures sector and assigns supervisory 
 
 43.  Bernanke, supra note 16. 
 44.  See generally, Oliver DeBandt & Philipp Hartmann, Systemic Risk: A Survey 
(European Cent. Bank, Working Paper No. 35, 2009) (exploring systemic risk as the basis in 
economic crises), available at http://www.pedz.uni-mannheim.de/daten/edz-ki/ezb/00/w-
paper/ecbwp035.pdf. 
 45.  Anand, supra note 10. 
 46.  See generally, Erlend Nier, Macroprudential Policy-Taxonomy and Challenges, 
216 NAT’L ECON. REV. R1, R1 (2011) [hereinafter Nier] (exploring questions and strategies 
to effectively implement macroprudential regulation).. 
 47.  Weismann, supra note 29, at 8.  (“The current regulatory oversight model in the 
securities and futures financial marketplace can best be described as a hybrid of government 
and private sector governance.  Federal agencies, authorized to regulate within legal 
boundaries set by Congress, are bound in a governance partnership with private sector 
organizations including SROs (self-regulatory organizations), which ostensibly operate in 
lockstep with government regulation. Congress crafted this hybrid model of financial 
oversight with the passage of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act.  The original SEA 
regulatory model was aptly described by former SEC Chair Arthur Leavitt: ‘Our securities 
markets operate under a ‘self-regulatory’ system. Markets serve an important public 
interest, and deserve public oversight; but markets are also innovative and fast moving, 
and easily stifled by the heavy hand of government.  So Congress arrived at a 
formula in which the industry polices itself, with SEC oversight. This keeps us out of most 
day- to-day affairs, and allows us to keep our hands off, but our eyes open. And 
on those rare occasions when self-regulation goes off track, the SEC must act in the 
public interest’”).. 
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authority based upon “functional” operations.48  Thus, financial products or 
activities are regulated and supervised according to their function, no 
matter which market or firm offers the product or participates in the 
activity.49  This also means that more than one federal agency may be 
responsible for supervision at the same time.50  Broker-dealer activities, for 
instance, are generally subject to the SEC’s jurisdiction, whether the 
broker-dealer is a subsidiary of a bank holding company subject to Federal 
Reserve supervision or a subsidiary of an investment bank.51  According to 
the Government Accounting Office (GAO), “[t]he functional regulator 
approach is intended to provide consistency in regulation, focus regulatory 
restrictions on the relevant functions area, and avoid the potential need for 
regulatory agencies to develop expertise in all aspects of financial 
regulation.”52 
The relative benefits of the functionality model are two-fold.  First, 
specialization by regulators allows them to better understand the risks 
associated with particular activities or products.  Second, competition 
among regulators helps promote regulatory innovation, providing 
businesses with a method to move to regulators whose approaches better 
match the businesses’ operations.53  However, the Federal Reserve has 
admitted that although the model is effective in design, it is ineffective in 
its “execution.”54  This inefficiency has resulted in an “institution-by-
institution supervisory approach,” which fails to identify overall systemic 
instability.55  The solution to this problem is somewhat addressed by the 
Reform Act through the FSOC and its new role in bringing together the 
functional regulators to supervise big picture systemic risk posed by Wall 
Street and the banking industry.56  The functionality characteristic of the 
oversight model, however, remains in place and is not changed by the 
Reform Act.57 
 
 48.  Id. at 9. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT, GAO-08-32, INDUSTRY TRENDS 
CONTINUE TO CHALLENGE THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2007), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/270/267957.pdf. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Res. Bank, Fostering Financial Stability, Address 
Before 2012 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Financial Markets Conference, Stone 
Mountain Georgia (April 9, 2012). 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Weismann, supra note 29, at 9. 
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C. The Financial Services Oversight Council (FSOC) 
Notably, the Reform Act does not change this model of empowering 
and limiting agency regulatory authority despite the creation of the new 
systemic risk overseer, the FSOC.58 The FSOC consists of ten voting 
members including, nine federal financial regulatory agencies and an 
independent member with insurance expertise and five nonvoting 
members.59 
In enacting the Reform Act, Congress responded to various criticisms 
of the functional regulatory model.60  Congress recognized that the then 
existing regulatory structure focused regulators narrowly on individual 
institutions and markets, which allowed supervisory gaps to grow and 
regulatory inconsistencies to emerge, which in turn, permitted arbitrage and 
weakened standards.61  No single entity held responsibility for monitoring 
and addressing risks to financial stability posed by different types of 
financial firms operating in and across multiple markets.62  As a result, 
important parts of the system were left unregulated.63  The federal 
regulatory agencies’ analyses selected in this article will aptly illustrate this 
point.  The Reform Act is an attempt to fix the flaws, not eliminate the 
 
 58.  Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1001, 4 
Stat. 1376 (2010), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-4173. 
 59.  Id. at § 111(b)(1)(A-j). The voting federal regulatory agencies include: the 
Secretary of the Treasury, who serves as the Chairperson of the FSOC, the Chairman 
of the Board of Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System,  the  Comptroller  of  the  
Currency,  the Director of the newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the 
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Chairperson of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Chairperson of the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission, the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the Chairman 
of the National Credit Union Administration Board (NCUA), and an independent member 
with insurance expertise that is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate 
for a six-year term.  H.R. 4173,111th Cong. § 111(2010).  The FHFA was added by the 
Reform Act to replace the now dissolved OTS. Nonvoting regulatory members are selected 
from various state agencies and serve only in an advisory capacity. The state nonvoting 
members have two-year terms.  Id. at § 111(b)(2). 
 60.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-1049T, FINANCIAL 
REGULATION: RECENT CRISIS REAFFIRMS THE NEED TO OVERHAUL THE U.S. REGULATORY 
SYSTEM 2 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d091049t.pdf.  (“The current 
U.S. financial regulatory system is fragmented due to complex arrangements of federal and 
state regulation put into place over the past 150 years . . . . Today, almost a dozen federal 
regulatory agencies, numerous self-regulatory organizations, and hundreds of state financial 
regulatory agencies share responsibility for overseeing the financial services industry”). 
 61.  FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, TREAS., BUDGET OF THE PRESIDENT, FISCAL 
YEAR 2014 (2002), at FSOC-3, available at http://www.treasury.gov/about/budget-
performance/CJ14/14.%20FSOC%20CJ%20Final%20ok.pdf. 
 62.  Bernanke, supra note 16. 
 63.  Id. 
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model, and to provide business with a “strong incentive to avoid becoming 
systemically significant” or “too big to fail.”64 
As Chairman Ben Bernanke explained, the purpose of the FSOC is to 
provide a forum for agencies with differing responsibilities and 
perspectives to share information and approaches and facilitate 
identification and mitigation of emerging threats to financial stability.65  It 
is intended “that the lines of accountability for systemic oversight be 
clearly drawn, [but that] the council should not be directly involved in rule-
writing and supervision.66  Rather, those functions should remain with the 
relevant supervisors, with the council in a coordinating role.”67  Thus, the 
FSOC can be characterized as more of a “looker” rather than a “doer” with 
a significant exception where the marketplace is “imperiled,” a situation 
still to be defined by implementing regulations.68 
The creation of the FSOC also responds to the risk that the 
information relied on by a systemic risk regulator, and supplied by a 
functional regulator, is merely derivative in nature and may lag behind real 
time events due to coordination efforts.69  This issue is problematic in times 
of crisis as evidenced by the recent subprime mortgage debacle.  In this 
situation, a council of regulators, such as the FSOC, is conducive to 
information aggregation.70  To identify emerging stress and imbalances and 
then address them through timely and efficient regulatory calibration, the 
systemic regulator must have close connections to the functional regulator 
and regular and close contacts with multiple market representatives and 
intermediaries.71  To achieve calibrated regulation, the macroprudential 
model is designed to ensure that all systemically important markets are 
subject to consolidated supervision.72  This complex task requires 
coordination, timely information sharing, and policy coordination at both 
the domestic and international levels.73 
 
 64.  David Moss, An Ounce of Prevention, HARVARD MAG., Sept.-Oct. 2009, at 5, 
available at 
http://harvardmagazine.com/2009/09/financial-risk-management-plan. 
 65.  Bernanke, supra note 16. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Weismann, supra note 29, at 13. 
 69.  Nazareth, supra note 18, at 847. 
 70.  Bernanke, supra note 16. 
 71.  PAUL VOLCKER, THE GROUP OF THIRTY THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION 
APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE: APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES 
IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE, 14 (2008), available at 
http://www.group30.org/images/PDF/The%20Structure%20of%20Financial%20Supervision
.pdf. 
 72.  Bernanke, supra note16. 
 73.  Id. 
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III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFORM MODEL THROUGH THE 
REGULATORY INFRASTRUCTURE 
Can the hybrid macroprudential reform model work effectively and 
efficiently within the boundaries and limitations of the current U.S. federal 
regulatory system?  Erlend Nier, Senior Financial Sector Expert at the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), postulates that, critical to the success 
of the implementation of any macroprudential oversight model, are four 
key factors: information collection powers, designation powers, rulemaking 
and calibration powers, and a strong mandate.74  Information collection 
starts with an assessment of systemic risk for the financial sector as an 
integrative whole.75 The macroprudential authority should have designation 
powers or the authority to create policy for all systemic institutions.76  
Rule-making should be calibrated across time and industry sectors.77  
Finally, a strong mandate should constrain the discretionary use of powers 
and, through legal regulation, define the primary objectives of the 
macroprudential authority.78 
Nier’s ideal model of the system of macroprudential oversight does 
not completely coalesce with the existing U.S. regulatory model. As noted 
above, the FSOC is more of a “looker” rather than a “doer” with the critical 
aspects of credible regulatory oversight remaining within each federal 
agency whose powers are strictly mandated by Congress.  However, Nier’s 
framework, along with an understanding of how the current U.S. regulatory 
infrastructure operates, does provide a starting point to evaluate whether 
the U.S. regulatory system and the Reform Act’s macroprudential model 
can successfully interface to achieve real economic and market reforms. 
A. The U.S. System of Regulatory Oversight 
Credible regulatory oversight is a central component in achieving the 
goal of good corporate governance.  In the Enron hearings, Congress 
credited the absence of credible oversight as one of the principle causes of 
the corporate debacle.79  It concluded that both the regulators and the 
 
 74.  Nier, supra note 46, at R3. 
 75.  Id. at R6. 
 76.  Id. at R7. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOV. AFFAIRS, REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT 
OF ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, S. Prt. 107-75, at 2 (2002), 
available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-107SPRT82147/pdf/CPRT-107SPRT82147.pdf.  (“In 
looking at the array of purported checks on financial misbehavior, what Committee staff 
WEISMANN, PETERSON, AND BUSCAGLIA_FINAL (ARTICLE 2).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/28/2014  2:31 PM 
1044 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 16.4 
 
traditional “corporate watchdogs” in the private sector “failed to bark.” 
More recently, the FCIC Report of investigation of the current financial 
crisis echoes the same sentiment, noting that the regulators were simply not 
“at their posts.”80 
Credible oversight is also important in its breach. Particularly where 
markets lack transparency or are otherwise unregulated, as with derivatives 
and hedge funds, such unregulated, unsupervised financial markets can all 
too easily suffer catastrophic failure. If a market center gains a reputation 
as having lax oversight and surveillance, that market will suffer the 
consequences. Those consequences include “the harsh reality that where 
there is no market, there is no value.”81  The recent collapse of capital 
markets resulting from inadequate or absent credible oversight underscores 
the true importance of the discussion. 
In simple terms, credible regulatory oversight is, at a minimum, a 
function determining whether the agency is doing the job that it is charged 
by law to do. Simply put, credible regulatory oversight is at least a function 
of whether the agency is doing the job that it is authorized by law to do.82  
In 1993, Congress passed the Government Performance and Results Act 
(GPRA) to “improve the confidence of the American people in the 
capability of the Federal Government, by systematically holding federal 
agencies accountable for achieving program results.”83  The Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) is responsible for the implementation of 
the GPRA.84 The OMB typically examines the overall effectiveness of the 
entire federal apparatus and/or its various parts.85 
Additionally, the Inspector General Act of 1978 was enacted to 
 
discovered was deeply disturbing not so much because they uncovered malfeasance or 
intentional wrongdoing on anyone’s part (although that seems to have been present in some 
cases as well), but because what emerged was a story of systemic and arguably catastrophic 
failure, a failure of all the watchdogs to properly discharge their appointed roles. Despite the 
magnitude of Enron’s implosion and the apparent pervasiveness of its fraudulent conduct, 
virtually no one in the multilayered system of controls devised to protect the public detected 
Enron’s problems, or, if they did, they did nothing to correct them or alert investors. Not one 
of the watchdogs was there to prevent or warn of the impending disaster . . . .” ). 
 80.  FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE 
CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES, xviii (2011), 
available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-
reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf. 
 81.  William Bodine & Christopher Nagel, Quants Gone Wild - the Subprime Crisis, 
WALL ST. J., March 2008, available at http://247wallst.com/2008/03/27/quants-gone-wil/ 
[hereinafter Bodine]. 
 82.  Weismann, supra note 29, at 5. 
 83.  Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62 §2(b)(1) 
(1993). 
 84.  Id. at § 3(a). 
 85.  Id. at § 3. 
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conduct and supervise audits and investigations relating to the programs 
and operations of numerous federal agencies.86 Functionally, the IG focuses 
on the operations of a specific agency,87 whereas the OMB examines the 
overall effectiveness of the regulatory apparatus, or some part thereof, in 
connection with a particular systemic issue or problem.88 The Reform Act 
also creates the Council of Inspectors General on Financial Oversight 
(CIGFO), which consists of all of the IGs assigned to audit the performance 
of the federal regulators serving on the FSOC.89  The regulators are now 
ostensibly more highly regulated. 
Ideally, when the audit results reveal that the agency has satisfied its 
congressional mandate, it acts credibly.  When the agency does not, it fails. 
The problem is that averting crisis through adequate supervision is often 
difficult to document.  When something does not go wrong, it is hard to 
prove that the system is functioning because the regulators are supposedly 
fulfilling their respective jobs. 
B. Externalities Impacting Credible Regulatory Oversight 
Oversight may also be credible in the sense that it satisfies its 
congressional mandate; however, oversight may still be unable to prevent 
corporate misconduct where the circumstances are beyond the regulator’s 
 
 86.  Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95−452, 92 Stat. 1101, H.R. 8588 
(1978). . 
 87.  Id. §§4(a)(4); 6(a)(2); 6(c); See also Robert Longley, About the Office of the 
Inspector General, http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/thepresidentandcabinet/a/oig.htm. 
(“Within the federal agencies are politically independent individuals called Inspectors 
General who are responsible for ensuring that the agencies operate efficiently, effectively 
and legally”). 
 88.  The Mission and Structure of the Office of Management and Budget, 
WHITEHOUSE.GOV, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/organization_mission.  
(“The management side of OMB is comprised of five offices, four of which are statutory, 
that oversee and coordinate the Administration’s procurement, financial management, e-
government, performance and personnel management, and information and regulatory 
policies.  In each of these areas, OMB’s role includes not only administrative management 
functions, but also program and policy management (e.g., program delivery and outcomes).  
This role encompasses oversight of how agencies devise, implement, manage, and evaluate 
the statutory programs and policies for which they are responsible.  This responsibility is 
central to OMB’s efforts to assist in agency strategic planning, goal-setting, performance 
measurement, information management, evaluation, and policy research.  These functions 
are essential parts of the policy and program direction advice that OMB provides.” ). 
 89.  See generally COUNCIL OF INSPECTORS GEN. ON FIN. OVERSIGHT, ANNUAL REPORT 
OF THE COUNCIL OF INSPECTORS GENERAL ON FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT, (2011), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/oig/files/CIGFO_Annual_Report_July_2011.pdf. 
 (explaining the creation and composition of the Council of Inspectors General on Financial 
Oversight). 
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sphere of control. In short, credible supervision may not necessarily result 
in credible oversight where outside forces prevent or interfere with the 
regulatory oversight function. 
First, even assuming that the regulatory agency is functioning 
according to its legal mandate, the congressionally authorized degree of 
supervision may be inadequate to detect and prevent corporate and 
financial misconduct.90 Thus, the agency may be doing precisely what it is 
authorized to do but lacks congressional authority to prevent the problem.91  
Case in point: the CFTC, through its former chair Brooksley Born, 
requested and was refused the congressional authority to regulate 
derivatives.92 
Even more problematic are those policy decisions made outside of the 
control of a particular regulatory agency that may impact the agency’s 
ability to control the consequences in the marketplace.93  Indeed, John 
Taylor of Stanford University makes a compelling argument that 
government intervention and conscious economic policy decisions 
designed to protect consumers actually created, worsened, and prolonged 
the current financial crisis.94 Also, not to be forgotten is the wave of 
deregulation during the Reagan era, referred to as “the cure that killed” and 
crippled regulatory oversight.95 
Next, market innovations may simply outpace regulatory control.96  
 
 90.  Brooksley Born, Chairperson, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 
Regulatory Responses to the Risks in the OTC Derivatives Market, Address to ABA Section 
of Business Law (Nov. 13, 1998), available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speeches/opaborn-40.htm. (“Notably, no reporting requirements 
are imposed on most OTC derivatives market participants. This lack of basic information 
about the positions held by OTC derivatives users and about the nature and extent of their 
exposures potentially allows them to take positions that may threaten our regulated markets 
or, indeed, our economy without the knowledge of any federal regulatory authority.”) 
[hereinafter Born].   
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id.; See also DVD: Frontline: The Warning (PBS 2009), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/warning/view/ (describing the requests of 
Chairperson Brooksley Born) [hereinafter Frontline]. 
 93.  See generally, JOHN TAYLOR, GETTING OFF TRACK: HOW GOVERNMENT ACTIONS 
AND INTERVENTIONS CAUSED, PROLONGED AND WORSENED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (Hoover 
Inst. Press 2009) (describing the problem of policy decisions made without control of 
particular agencies). 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  See generally, KITTY CALAVITA & HENRY N. PONTELL, Heads I Win, Tails You 
Lose: Deregulation, Crime And Crisis In The Savings and Loan Industry, in CRIMES OF 
PRIVILEGE (Shover & Wright eds., Oxford University Press 2001) (describing deregulation 
during the Reagan era). 
 96.  See Henry Hu, Misunderstood  Derivatives: The  Causes  of  Informational  Failure  
and  The  Promise  of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457 (1993) [hereinafter 
Hu] (describing market innovations); The Modern Process of Financial Innovation and the 
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Henry Hu demonstrated in his landmark article in 1993 that the very design 
of a financial product has the ability to impede regulatory oversight and 
control.97  Hu’s point is aptly illustrated by Thomas Donaldson’s example 
of unregulated hedge funds, which he argues are, by design, made up of 
“intractable conflicts that cannot be resolved through government 
regulation.”98 
Additionally, concealed fraudulent behavior may impede oversight.99  
For example, the fraudulent use of earnings by management is typically 
invisible to the naked regulatory eye even upon audit of the books and 
records.100  The resulting collapse of trust, described by Greenspan as the 
cornerstone of the marketplace, some argue, cannot be repaired by 
regulation at all.101  Indeed, certain financial behaviors are just “bad to the 
bone” and cannot be fixed until some form of internal corporate 
governance addresses the inherent conflicts of interest inbred in corporate 
culture.102  Thus, the problem may not be one of failed credible regulatory 
oversight but instead, one caused by other outside forces, externalities, that 
can overtake the oversight function and control the outcome. 
Inevitably, the responsibility for oversight failure must be shared with 
the private sector, which has strenuously insisted on preserving a self-
regulatory model.  As part of that self-regulatory model, the private sector 
has certain delineated oversight duties to the public, such as those 
performed by self-regulatory organizations (SROs).103  At its most basic 
level, self-regulation is the manner by which all firms self-police their own 
 
Regulation of OTC Derivatives: OTC Derivatives: Modernizing Oversight to Increase 
Transparency and Reduce Risks: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate Banking Com.: Subcomm. 
on Securities, Insurance, and Investment, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Henry T. C. 
Hu), available at 
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=a8
9592d9-cbaa-4930-8ce4-de1291688474. 
 97.  Hu, supra note 96. 
 98.  See generally Thomas Donaldson, Hedge Fund Ethics, 18 J. Bus. Ethics 405 (2008) 
[hereinafter Donaldson] (exampling the inability of government to resolve the conflicts of 
unregulated hedge funds). 
 99.  See MIRIAM WEISMANN, CORPORATE CRIME AND FINANCIAL FRAUD, THE LEGAL 
AND FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF CORPORATE MISCONDUCT (American Bar Association 
Press, Chicago 2012) [hereinafter CORPORATE CRIME]. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Res. Bank, Address to the Conference on Bank 
Structure and Competition, Chicago, Illinois (May 8, 2003), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2003/20030508/. 
 102.  Donaldson, supra note 98, at 415. 
 103.  See BrokerCheck Glossary, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH. (June 28, 2010), 
http://www.finra.org/Investors/ToolsCalculators/BrokerCheck/P015176. (defining an SRO 
as “[a]n entity, such as FINRA or the New York Stock Exchange, responsible for regulating 
its members by adopting and enforcing rules that govern its members’ business conduct”); 
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activities to ensure that they are meeting all fiduciary and other duties to 
their clients.104  In fact, the old “Shingle Theory” was founded on the 
principle that, if you hold yourself out to the public as offering to do 
business, you are implicitly representing that you will do so in a fair and 
honest manner.”105  In many instances, the private sector has failed to live 
up to its part of the bargain as envisioned by Congress.106  Thus, the 
regulatory oversight model is clearly a shared function in the marketplace 
where the federal regulatory infrastructure does not and is not intended to 
unilaterally control all aspects of oversight. Indeed, as history has shown, 
the private sector must frequently be held accountable by regulation 
infused with financial disincentives to avoid the failure to credibly self-
regulate.107 
Finally, the passage of the Reform Act signals an attempt by 
Congress, in lockstep with the economic policy of macroprudential 
regulation heralded by the Federal Reserve Bank, to deal with a bigger 
problem; namely, the desperately needed overhaul of an outdated 
regulatory infrastructure that is ill-suited to the task of financial regulatory 
oversight.108  Achieving credible regulatory oversight is less likely where 
the adeptness of federal agencies anointed with supervisory responsibility 
critically lags behind innovative financial products and activities in the 
marketplace. 
C. Overview: The Divided Roles of the Banking and Security 
Regulators 
The two primary and intrinsically interrelated financial sectors 
identified by the Reform Act include the banking industry and the 
 
 104.  The SEC requires self-regulatory organizations to register with the SEC.  
Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, SEC (2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/regis33.htm; See also Other Links, SEC (2013),  
http://www.sec.gov/links.shtml#selfreg (providing a listing of other SROs). 
 105.  Lori Richards, Director, Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, U.S. 
SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, Speech at NRS Fall 2000 Compliance Conference: Self-
Regulation in the New Era (Sept. 11, 2000), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch398.htm [hereinafter Richards]. 
 106.  The Watchdogs Didn’t Bark: Enron and The Wall Street Analysts: Hearing Before 
the Comm. On Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong.  (2002) (statement of Sen. Lieberman, 
Chairman, Sen. Comm. Governmental Affairs). 
 107.  ACHARYA, V, L. PEDERSEN, T. PHILLIPON AND M. RICHARDSON, N.Y.U. STERN 
WHITE PAPERS PROJECT, REGULATING SYSTEMIC RISK,  283-304 (2008). 
 108.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT, GAO 09-216, FINANCIAL 
REGULATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR CRAFTING AND ASSESSING PROPOSALS TO MODERNIZE THE 
OUTDATED U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM (2009) [hereinafter ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE REPORT]. 
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securities and futures markets.109 With some new additions and 
modifications created by the Reform Act, the federal regulatory structure is 
as follows.  In the banking sector, under the functional regulatory model, 
multiple federal and state agencies may regulate the same entity based upon 
the functionality model described above.110 However, the primary 
supervisor of a domestic banking institution is determined by the type of 
institution and the regulator responsible to license its operations.111  In the 
banking industry, that regulatory configuration depends on the type of 
charter under which the banking institution operates.112  State regulators 
charter institutions and participate in the oversight of those institutions. 
However, all of these institutions have a primary federal regulator if they 
offer federal deposit insurance.113  Additionally, these federal regulators 
establish capital requirements for the depository institutions, supervise and 
conduct onsite examinations and offsite monitoring to assess an 
institution’s financial condition, and monitor and enforce compliance with 
banking and consumer laws.114 The regulators issue regulations, take 
enforcement actions, and close institutions determined to be insolvent.115 
The other primary financial sector, the securities and futures sector, is 
regulated under a combination of SRO’s, subject to oversight of the 
appropriate federal regulator, and direct oversight by the SEC and/or the 
CFTC.  It is a system grounded upon self-regulation.  SROs, such as the 
New York Stock Exchange and the AMEX, have responsibility for 
oversight of the securities markets and their participants by establishing the 
standards for their members; monitoring business conduct; and bringing 
disciplinary actions against their members for violating applicable federal 
statutes, SEC rules, and SRO rules.116  The SEC supervises SROs by 
inspecting their operations, reviewing SRO rule proposals and appeals of 
final disciplinary proceedings.117  In the futures industry, SROs include the 
futures exchanges and the National Futures Association.118  Futures SROs 
 
 109.  Reform Act, supra note 12.  
 110.  Reform Act, supra note 12. 
 111.  Reform Act, supra note 12. 
 112.  Reform Act, supra note 12. 
 113.  Reform Act, supra note 12. 
 114.  Reform Act, supra note 12. 
 115.  Reform Act, supra note 12. 
 116.  See Richards, supra note 105 (holding the private sector accountable via financial 
disincentives). 
 117.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT, GAO-05-61, FINANCIAL 
REGULATION INDUSTRY CHANGES PROMPT NEED TO RECONSIDER U.S. REGULATORY 
STRUCTURE 34 (2004). 
 118.  See generally, Self-Regulation and Self-Regulatory Organizations in the Futures 
Industry, 70 Fed. Reg. 71090 (Nov. 25, 2005)(describing self-regulatory organizations in 
general). 
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are responsible for establishing and enforcing rules governing member 
conduct and trading; providing for the prevention of market manipulation, 
including monitoring trading activity; ensuring that futures industry 
professionals meet qualifications; and examining members for financial 
strength and other regulatory purposes.119  The CFTC independently 
monitors, among other things, exchange trading activity, large trader 
positions, and certain market participants’ financial conditions.120 
Thus, one limitation under current macroprudential policy, viewed 
under Nier’s ideal model of information gathering and calibration, is that 
functional regulation requiring timely information sharing among 
numerous regulators of the same institution remains intact.121  Additionally, 
the policy does not directly impact the system of self-regulation that is a 
major component of risk control management in the private sector.122  The 
private sector remains an outsider in terms of stakeholder membership in 
the FSOC.  Nor does the new policy address in pragmatic terms the impact 
of externalities on the ability of various regulatory agencies to engage in 
credible oversight.123 
D. The Sources and Limits of Divided Regulatory Oversight Authority 
Regulatory agencies have limited powers.124  Understanding these 
limitations on the exercise of agency regulatory authority is critical to 
evaluating the likely success of implemented policy that applies Nier’s 
model with respect to rulemaking authority and calibration.  The Supreme 
Court has made clear that regulatory authority to act must always be based 
on a specific grant of congressional power.125  “Regardless of how serious 
the problem an administrative agency seeks to address . . . it may not 
exercise its authority ‘in a manner that is inconsistent with the 
administrative structure that Congress enacted into law.’”126 
There are also legal limitations on the acceptable breadth of agency 
interpretations of statutes in the course of drafting implementing 
 
 119.   U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT, GAO-05-61, FINANCIAL 
REGULATION INDUSTRY CHANGES PROMPT NEED TO RECONSIDER U.S. REGULATORY 
STRUCTURE (2004). 
 120.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT, GAO-08-32, INDUSTRY TRENDS 
CONTINUE TO CHALLENGE THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2007). 
 121.  Nier, supra note 46, at R1. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000) 
(quoting ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 517 (1988)). 
 125.   Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp,, 529 U.S. at 125 
 126.  Id. 
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regulations.127  “The power of an administrative agency to administer a 
congressionally created and funded program necessarily requires the 
formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly 
or explicitly, by Congress.”128  If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the 
agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to 
implement a specific provision of the statute by regulation.129  The courts 
will accord such legislative regulations “controlling weight” unless they are 
“arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”130  In short, 
regulators do not have carte blanche to regulate to prevent harm even if the 
result is desirable to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public.  
Nor can an agency create corporate governance standards for business or 
pass regulations that result in a substantial economic impact in the 
marketplace unless Congress accords the rule and policy making authority 
to that agency through legislative grant.  The agency also has no 
independent power to detect and prevent wrongdoing.  Here, credible 
oversight is restricted to Congressional will and not agency whim. 
Thus, the first step in the agency analysis examines the enabling 
legislation to determine the scope of each agency’s powers in their 
respective oversight roles.  The analysis also reviews the seminal court 
cases that restrict the boundaries of agency authority under the 
congressional mandate.  Returning to the definition of credible oversight, 
this data illustrates that the operation of the regulatory infrastructure is at 
least a function of whether the regulatory agency is doing the job that it is 
authorized by law to do.  The agency may be doing precisely what it is 
authorized to do by law, but may still lack the real authority to prevent a 
particular problem. Concomitantly, policy decisions made outside of the 
control of a particular regulatory agency may impact the agency’s ability to 
control the consequences in the marketplace and create regulatory gaps.  
Both situations may interfere with agency supervision and the 
implementation of macroprudential policy by federal regulators. 
 
 127.  See infra notes 128-130 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of 
regulations). 
 128.  Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974). 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
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IV. UNDERSTANING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
REGULATORS AND THE RULES 
A. The Securities and Exchange Commission 
1. Regulatory model and authority 
With the creation of the SEC in 1934, a conscious policy decision was 
made about the character of oversight that the new regulatory body was to 
exercise over issuers in the marketplace.131  The model was premised on 
self-regulation by issuers, through a system of self-reporting under the 
supervision of the regulator.132  Here, supervision did not vest responsibility 
in the regulator to perform internal corporate auditing functions or other 
“hands-on” supervision.133  It was never intended that the SEC would 
become the issuer’s accountant.134  Instead, it was the job of the issuer to 
hire credible third party professionals, such as accountants and lawyers, to 
perform audits, issue opinion letters, and assist in full and fair disclosure 
through a system of documentary reporting to the SEC.135 
Simply, the regulator was to review and inspect only the issuer’s 
mandated disclosures, to confirm that it was abiding by the rules.136  
Critical to the model of self-regulation was trust.  The regulator was 
supposed to be able to rely upon the reporting disclosures of the issuer.137  
That model also required the regulator to actually look at the materials 
being submitted by the issuer at least every three years to make such a 
determination.138  Credible oversight in this context meant a hands-off 
approach to issuers with, as former SEC Chairman and Supreme Court 
Justice William O. Douglas described, the “shotgun behind the door,” in 
the event an issuer engaged in improper or unlawful behavior.139  The SEC 
intended barebones agency regulation to avoid interference with natural 
 
 131.  CORPORATE CRIME, supra note 99. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOV. AFFAIRS, REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF 
ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, S. Prt. 107-75, at  2 (2002), available 
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-107SPRT82147/pdf/CPRT-107SPRT82147.pdf. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE: THE ADDRESSES AND 
STATEMENTS OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS AS MEMBER AND CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION 82 (James Allen ed., 1940). 
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market forces.140  The notion that respected third party professionals would 
not maintain their independence was not accorded much weight.141  In this 
way, private sector issuers were burdened with the obligation to provide 
corporate transparency and the regulator was entitled to rely on the 
watchful eye of third party professionals ensuring that the issuer satisfied 
his burden.142  These third party professionals were thought of as part of a 
class of “corporate watchdogs,” providing actual review and oversight.143  
Indeed, the belief was that the marketplace had a pack of such watchdogs, 
including not only accountants and lawyers, but also the self-regulatory 
organizations (SRO’s), such as the stock exchanges, investment advisors, 
banks and market appraisers.144  Assuming each watchdog performed its 
functions in a conflict-free environment, the risk or opportunity for 
corporate wrongdoing would diminish.145 
There is nothing in this legislative model that contemplates anything 
more than a supervisory role played by regulators with reliance on 
information supplied by the issuer, combined with the reactive power to 
punish in the event of a breach of trust.146  The federal agencies are bound 
in a governance partnership with the private sector.147 This regulatory 
philosophy is echoed in the agency philosophy espoused on its website: 
“The SEC facilitates the exchange of reliable and necessary information to 
enable investors to make informed investment choices.”148  It is this 
legislative model that defines Nier’s key factor, collection of information 
directly from the firm to the macroprudential regulator.149 
Periodically, Congress considered increasing the powers of the SEC 
and various statutes were added to the arsenal of regulatory enforcement 
tools.150  Yet, the SEC and Congress have steadfastly remained at a 
 
 140.  STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOV. AFFAIRS, REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF 
ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, S. Prt. 107-75, at  2 (2002), available 
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-107SPRT82147/pdf/CPRT-107SPRT82147.pdf. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  CORPORATE CRIME, supra note 99. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market 
Integrity and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml [hereinafter The Investor’s Advocate]. 
 149.  Nier, supra note 46, at R1. 
 150.  See generally How Investigations Work, SEC, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Article/Detail/Article/1356125787012#.UioX-D9gHmM 
(providing an overview of the historical development of the SEC’s role and law 
enforcement powers). 
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respectful distance to avoid undue interference in the marketplace. That 
philosophy is embedded in the federal regulations which require the SEC to 
consider, in addition to protection of the investors, whether the proposed 
regulatory action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation in the market.151 As noted below, the IG has recently chastised 
the SEC for its failure to follow this mandate in its current efforts to create 
new implementing regulations under the Reform Act.152  As such, the 
model creates a need for the SEC to serve two masters in the marketplace, 
investors and an efficient market.  However, those interests do not always 
coincide. 
Thus, the regulator is intended to supervise a system of self-regulation 
and enforce reactively in response to self-regulatory failure.  This model of 
“credible oversight” was created by Congress based upon a myriad of 
policy considerations and political interests.  Indeed, trust as the 
cornerstone of marketplace regulation is still urged as the best regulatory 
model today.153  This philosophy may directly impact the scope and breadth 
of regulation designed to manage risk under the Reform Act.  In short, 
macroprudential regulation is not intended to supplant the “hands-off” 
economic philosophy that has historically characterized the congressional 
response to market failure. 
2. Recent oversight initiatives 
In the wake of the Enron debacle, the SEC was severely criticized for 
its failure to have provided credible oversight.154  Responding to the crisis, 
Congress enacted several new oversight provisions in the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX) increasing both the supervisory powers and responsibilities of 
the SEC and the disclosure obligations of the private sector, including: 1) 
annual reports to the SEC must include an assessment of management’s 
internal controls and must be attested to by the auditing firm; 2) the SEC 
must conduct enhanced review of certain issuer disclosures in periodic 
reports issued on a regular and systematic basis for protection of investors; 
 
 151.  The Investor’s Advocate, supra note 148. 
 152.  SEC INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, SEC’S OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND 
RELATED ENTITIES: BROKER-DEALER RISK ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (2008), http://www.sec-
oig.gov/Reports/AuditsInspections/2008/446-b.pdf. 
 153.  Donaldson, supra note 98. 
 154.  STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOV. AFFAIRS, REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF 
ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, S. Prt. 107-75, at  5 (2002), available 
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-107SPRT82147/pdf/CPRT-107SPRT82147.pdf 
(“[T]he SEC’s interactions with Enron reveal the downside to the Commission’s largely 
reactive approach to market regulation and should provide an impetus for the Commission 
to reorient some of its activities toward more proactive anti-fraud measures”). 
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and, 3) directors and officers must certify financial information contained 
in their own periodic reports submitted to the SEC.155 
Was this change in oversight initiatives perceived as enough to fix the 
problem? There is no unified response to that question. Instead, there exists 
a difference of opinion among the concerned stakeholders about how to 
define the real problem in the first instance.  Lynn Turner, former SEC 
chief auditor, saw the problem differently.156  He concluded that current 
unbridled lending practices contributing to the mortgage crisis reflected a 
failure of all of the operative parts of the current regulatory model.157  In a 
statement before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs on Enhancing Investor Protection and Regulation of the Securities 
Markets in 2009, Turner concluded: “While lenders were making bad loans 
in exchange for an upfront fee, and gatekeepers were falling down on the 
job, federal government agencies were failing to supervise or regulate those 
under their oversight, as well as failing to enforce laws.”158  He also noted 
that the lack of regulation of new products also contributed to the failure.159 
For Turner, however, the problem is not necessarily solved by 
promulgating more rules.160  Instead, the problem is solved by getting the 
stakeholders to comply with existing rules.161 
Finally, some observers question whether the regulatory partnership 
model between the government and the private sector has any validity and 
view this partnership with great cynicism.162  They argue that the 
partnership model of self-regulation and government oversight breeds an 
incestuous relationship between government regulators and the private 
sector, which dilutes credible oversight.163  There is no set of rules designed 
to fix this public perception. 
 
 155.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
 156.  See generally Enhancing Investor Protection and Regulation of the Securities 
Markets: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 111 Cong.  
(March 10, 2009) (statement of Lynn Turner, former S.E.C. Chief Auditor) (“There are 
really three root causes of this problem: people made bad loans, gatekeepers sold out, and a 
lack of regulation or regulators missing in action, quite frankly. And it is not the first 
time.”). 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  HARRY MARKOPOLOS, NO ONE WOULD LISTEN: A TRUE FINANCIAL THRILLER (John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2010). 
 163.  Id. 
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3. Evaluating the regulator 
It is worth revisiting SEC Director Richard’s argument that risk-based 
examination programs were in place and suitable to prevent and detect risk 
during the most critical periods of economic failure.164  Was the SEC’s 
voluntary risk-based oversight program, developed post-Enron, a success 
or part of a failed oversight paradigm?  Concededly, the programs missed 
Bernard Madoff’s simplistic Ponzi scheme but they did manage to “catch” 
Bear Sterns.  However, the 2008 Report issued by the IG, in connection 
with the SEC oversight of Bear Sterns under the Consolidated Supervised 
Entity (CSE) Program, questioned the real efficacy of CSE program in 
view of the fact that Bear Stearns was found to be in compliance with most 
of the regulations but still became insolvent.165  The SEC promulgated the 
regulations, Bear Stearns complied with the regulations, and Bear Stearns 
failed.166 
A second IG report addressing SEC oversight of Bear Stearns under 
the Broker-Dealer Risk Assessment Program concluded that the SEC’s 
Division of Trading and Markets was not fulfilling its oversight obligations 
under the program and that concerns raised by the IG’s audit of the 
program in 2002 had not been adequately addressed by the SEC.167 Nearly 
one third of the firms under the Broker-Dealer Risk Assessment program 
had not even filed the required documents.168  The division had not 
adequately reviewed the filings made by others.169  The IG concluded that 
the failure to carry out the purpose and goals of the broker-dealer risk 
assessment program “hinders the Commission’s ability to foresee or 
respond to weaknesses in the financial markets.”170  However, these 
conclusions fueled not only a difference of opinion but also precipitated an 
angry outburst by the SEC. 
In response to the IG criticism, then SEC Chairman, Christopher Cox, 
conceded that the CSE program, created in 2004 in response to the 
lobbying efforts from the investment banking industry, was “fundamentally 
flawed from the very beginning” because investment banks could opt in or 
out of supervision voluntarily.171  But Cox blamed Congress for the failure 
 
 164.  Richards, supra note 105. 
 165.  SEC INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT, SEC’S OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND 
RELATED ENTITIES: BROKER-DEALER RISK ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (2008), 
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oig/reports/audits/2008/446-b.pdf. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id. at v. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Stephen Labaton, SEC Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, 
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of the program.172  The fact that investment bank holding companies were 
intentionally excluded from regulation by Congress by allowing them to 
withdraw from voluntary supervision at their discretion diminished the 
perceived mandate of the program and weakened its effectiveness.173  
Subsequently, Cox disbanded the CSE program, but only after the demise 
or reorganization of the five biggest Wall Street firms, including Bear 
Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley and Goldman 
Sachs.174 
Cox’s view that the supervisory debacle was the direct result of a 
“regulatory gap” created by Congress has support in the legislative history 
of deregulation.175  Some hindsight is useful here. In 1999, Congress passed 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) reversing the earlier restrictions 
between investment banks and commercial bank activities.176  The law 
authorized the SEC to regulate only the securities and brokerage operations 
of the investment banks, but not their holding companies.177  A gaping 
regulatory loophole hampered the SEC’s ability to control holding 
company financial activities.178  In 2002, the European Union, sensing an 
impending crisis in the unregulated holding company arena, sought to 
impose its own rules on unregulated holding companies unless they were 
otherwise regulated domestically.179  To avoid being subjected to the reach 
of European Union oversight, the investment banks lobbied the SEC to 
promulgate the voluntary CSE program.180  The program was arguably a 
sham designed to protect the political interests of the investment banking 
community and avoid government regulation where there was otherwise no 
clear intention to self-regulate. 
While disbanding the CSE program, Cox publicly warned that the 
same regulatory gap existed in the unregulated credit default swap 
 
Sept. 26, 2008 at A1 (quoting SEC Chairman, Christopher Cox) [hereinafter Labaton]. 
 172.  Press Release 2008-230, SEC, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated 
Supervised Entities Program (Sept. 26, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-230.htm [hereinafter Press Release 2008-230, 
SEC]. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6801 et seq.) (summarizing the provisions of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, also known as the Financial Services Modernization Act, including the 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) amendments). 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Labaton, supra note 171. 
 180.  ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT, supra note 108. 
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industry.181  Later, in testimony before Congress, then FDIC Chair Born 
recommended that Congress close the same regulatory gap.182  Both 
warnings were preceded by the earlier efforts of the GAO, which reported 
that the large financial interconnections between derivatives dealers posed 
risk to the financial system and recommended that Congress and financial 
regulators take action to ensure that the largest firms participating in the 
OTC derivatives markets be subject to regulatory oversight.183  Those 
repeated agency demands were vehemently opposed by Alan Greenspan, 
then FRB chairman, Lawrence Summers, and Robert Rubin in testimony 
before Congress.184  The argument of the “Greenspan bloc” was 
straightforward: policymakers need to ensure that systemic regulation is 
balanced with other national goals, including facilitating capital raising and 
fostering innovation.185  Booming economic prosperity solidified 
Congressional agreement with Greenspan.186  Now, the massive market 
failure has bred increased suspicion of an incestuous relationship between 
government regulators and the private sector.187 
The sustained but unheeded efforts of the SEC, the FDIC and the 
GAO also aptly illustrate that the agency may be doing precisely what it is 
authorized to do, but may still lack the real authority to prevent the problem 
by virtue of regulatory gaps existing in the regulatory framework.  The 
agency may not unilaterally act beyond the scope of its legislative grant of 
authority to solve an obvious and dangerous problem. Concomitantly, 
policy decisions made outside of the control of these regulatory agencies; 
namely, Congressional deference to the “Greenspan bloc,” clearly impacted 
the agencies’ ability to control the consequences in the marketplace.188 
4. Reform Act remediation 
In an effort to remediate the problem, the Reform Act has added two 
oversight “loop closing” features for previously unregulated derivatives 
 
 181.  Press Release 2008-230, SEC, supra note 172; STAFF OF S. COMM. ON 
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG. 2ND SESS., REP. ON THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF 
ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS, 31-36 (Comm. Print 2002). 
 182.  Born, supra note 90. 
 183.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REP., GAO/GGD-94-133, FINANCIAL 
DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM (1994). 
 184.  See Frontline, supra note 92 (examining early warnings and failures concerning the 
financial crisis of 2007). 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, FINAL REP. OF THE NAT’L COMM’N. ON THE CAUSES 
OF THE FIN. AND ECON. CRISIS IN THE U.S. (2011), http://www.fcic.gov/report. 
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and hedge funds.189  First, private equity and hedge funds with assets of 
$150 million dollars or more must register with the SEC.190  Venture capital 
funds remain exempt from full registration.191  Second, the “Volcker rule” 
bars proprietary trading unrelated to customer’s needs at government 
backed banks.192  Additionally, credit exposure to banks from derivative 
transactions must now be added to banks’ lending limits.193 
In 2012, the IG performed a cost-benefit analysis of the SEC’s rule 
making activities under the Reform Act.194  The IG concluded in the audit 
report that: 
[S]ome SEC Dodd-Frank Act rulemakings lacked clear, explicit 
explanations of the justification for regulatory action.  
Specifically, some of the rulemakings that were premised on 
market failure alluded to market failure but did not explicitly cite 
it as a justification or fully discuss it. Other rulemakings included 
language that erroneously suggested a market failure justification 
and contained no compelling alternative rationale in support of 
the action. OMB Circular A-4 identifies market failure as one of 
several possible justifications for federal agency regulation. In 
discussing this point, the circular provides that an agency must 
demonstrate that proposed action is necessary before 
recommending regulatory action.195 
Thus, a disconnect between the proposed regulations and the causes of 
the market failure may contribute to a flawed implementation of 
macroprudential policy in the future if court review concludes that the 
agency has failed to follow the limitations of its rulemaking authority.  In 
any case, piling more regulations on to the industry without a direct impact 
on the specific causes of market failure fails to achieve the goal of 
macroprudential reform. 
 
 189.  See Reform Act, supra note 12 (providing links to summaries of the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, including the full text, related bills and 
other information regarding the Act’s legislative history). 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  SEC INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT NO. 499, FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF COST BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS IN SELECTED SEC DODD-FRANK RULEMAKINGS (2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oig/reports/audits/2012/rpt499_followupreviewofd-
f_costbenefitanalyses_508.pdf. 
 195.  Id. 
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B. Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
1. Regulatory model and authority 
Under the Grain Futures Act of 1922, trading of futures contracts was 
supervised by the Department of Agriculture through the Grain Futures 
Administration.196  As part of the legislative fix to the financial crisis 
resulting in the “Great Depression,” Congress passed the Commodity 
Exchange Act (CEA) in 1936 and created the Commodity Exchange 
Commission (CEC).197  The CEC established the Grain Futures 
Administration.198  More than forty years passed until 1974 when Congress 
reorganized the CEC into the modern day CFTC under the Commodities 
Futures Trading Act (CFTA).199  The CFTA is generally crafted to regulate 
futures trading.200  Futures contracts allow purchasers to buy or sell a 
specific quantity of a commodity for delivery in the future.201  While 
traders are required to register with the CFTC and maintain certain 
minimum capital requirements, the registration functions were delegated to 
the National Futures Association, a SRO, by regulation.202 
The CFTC regulatory oversight model tracks the SEC model.203  The 
regulations are crafted to protect the public interest through a system of 
“effective self-regulation” of trading facilities, clearing systems, market 
participants and market professionals under the CFTC oversight.204  The 
CFTC has jurisdiction over most futures and options contracts, whether 
traded on an exchange or over the counter (OTC trading).205  However, the 
authority to regulate the securities markets is divided between the SEC and 
the CFTC in conformity with the functionality model described above.206  
The SEC regulates the functions of the securities and securities options 
 
 196.  Grain Futures Act of 1922, 42 Stat. 998 (1922) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.). 
 197.  Commodities Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 74-675, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936); History of 
the CFTC, U.S. COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/index.htm [hereinafter History of the CFTC]. 
 198.  History of the CFTC, supra note 197. 
 199.  Commodities Futures Trading Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 93-463 (1974); 
Mission & Responsibilities U.S. COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, 
http://www.cftc.gov/index.htm [hereinafter Mission & Responsibilities]. 
 200.  Commodities Futures Trading Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 93-463 (1974). 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Who We Are, NATIONAL FUTURES ASSOCIATION, http://www.nfa.futures.org/ (last 
visited April 25, 2014). 
 203.  See Mission & Responsibilities, supra note 199. 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Id. 
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markets.  The CFTC regulates the functions of most other markets.207 
Moreover, there are numerous regulatory gaps created by law in 
regard to the OTC regulatory function. The CEA excludes from CFTC 
regulatory oversight most over the counter (OTC) financial derivatives, 
including credit default swaps.208  In 2000, the Commodities Futures 
Modernization Act “clarified” that some off-exchange trading would be 
permitted and remain largely unregulated, including hedge funds.209  Both 
forms of trading, now excoriated as the culprits of the current financial 
crisis, were thus intentionally excluded from regulatory oversight by 
Congress.210  The CFTC was denied the authority by Congress to supervise 
these financial products.211  This statutory model has been amended in 
some measure by recent changes made by the Reform Act.212  However, 
until the enabling regulations are in place, the meaning of those changes 
will remain somewhat of an unknown.  This is particularly true where the 
system of parallel regulation between the SEC and the CFTC remains in 
place after the passage of the Reform Act. 
Section 3 of the CFTA authorizes three supervisory activities under 
the CFTC regulatory structure: 1) to protect the price discovery function; 2) 
to prevent the manipulation of commodities through trading schemes; and, 
3) to assure an effective vehicle for risk transference.213  While the financial 
futures market includes both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors, 
the OTC market is comprised mostly of professional broker dealers and 
institutional investors.214  Also, the challenge of overseeing the regulation 
of financial futures is considered functionally different than regulating 
metals futures, energy futures, or agricultural futures.215  So, the agency has 
 
 207.  U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, Report on Oversight of Trading 
on Regulated Futures Exchanges and Exempt Commercial Markets (2007), 
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/pr5403-
07_ecmreport.pdf. 
 208.  Commodities Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 74-675, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936). 
 209.  Commodities Future Modernization Act of 2000, H.R. 4541, 106th Cong. (2000). 
 210.  See Id. (explaining the significance of exchange-traded and OTC derivative 
instruments to our economy due to their risk-transferring attributes). 
 211.  History of the CFTC, supra note 197. See also Mission & Responsibilities, supra 
note 199. 
 212.  See Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, Title 
X, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Reform Act] (expanding the joint rule-making 
authority of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission in consultation with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). 
 213.  Commodities Futures Trading Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 93-463 (1974) 
[hereinafter CFTC ACT]. 
 214.  William Rainer, Chairman, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Remarks at 
the Twenty Second Annual Chicago-Kent College of Law Derivatives and Commodities 
Institute (Oct. 28, 1999), http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speeches/oparainer-2.htm. 
 215.  Id. 
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been required to reject a “one-size fits all” regulatory approach in its 
oversight function.216 
2. Recent oversight initiatives 
In 1998, the CFTC attempted to regulate derivatives.217  Under the 
leadership of its Chair, Brooksley Born, the CFTC issued a “Concept 
Release” aimed at market reform through the regulation and oversight of 
the OTC derivatives market.218  Born believed that this unregulated “dark 
market” could pose grave dangers to the economy.219  Alan Greenspan, 
Robert Rubin and Larry Summers testified before Congress in opposition 
to the attempt at regulation.220  The Greenspan bloc was successful in 
derailing regulatory efforts with the passage of the Commodities Future 
Modernization Act passed in 2000.221  The CFMA, which exempted most 
OTC derivatives from regulation, often referred to as the “Enron loophole,” 
is now also blamed for the current financial crisis.222 
Significantly, the explosive growth of trading in unregulated hedge 
fund portfolios and OTC derivatives during the period 1999-2004 was 
preceded by the near catastrophic failure of Long Term Capital 
Management (LTCM).  In fact, the LTCM failure proved that Born had 
accurately predicted the crisis. LTCM experienced large losses related to its 
$100 billion trading position in hedge funds.223  Viewed as a precursor to a 
global meltdown, the Clinton administration and the FRB pressured the 
financial institutions with large exposure to the hedge funds to provide $3.6 
billion as a cushion until the fund could be liquidated in an orderly 
fashion.224  Despite the attempts of Born, the SEC’s Christopher Cox and 
others, the regulatory gap has persisted until the recent passage of the 
 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  Born, supra note 90. 
 218.  Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg. 26114, 26115 (May 12, 1998), 
http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press98/opamntn.htm. 
 219.  See id. (asserting that OTC derivatives “can present significant risks if misused or 
misunderstood by market participants” and that “well publicized, financial losses over the 
last few years have focused the attention of the financial services industry [and] its 
regulators. . .on potential problems and abuses in the OTC derivatives market”). 
 220.  See Frontline, supra note 92 (discussing how the statements of the “Working 
Group,” including Alan Greenspan and Robert Rubin, ultimately dissuaded leaders from 
supporting Born’s attempts to regulate the “risky derivatives market” prior to the 2008 
financial crisis). 
 221.  Commodities Future Modernization Act of 2000, H.R. 4541, 106th Cong. (2000). 
 222.  Id. 
 223.  ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT, supra note 108. 
 224.  Id. 
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Reform Act.225  The meltdown that was predicted, experienced in the 
LTCM debacle, experienced in the energy trades conducted by Enron, and 
repeated by Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs, most major 
U.S. and foreign financial institutions, and many others, is a main 
contributor to the current financial crisis.226  In short, Federal Reserve Bank 
economic policy, supported by Congress, directly impacted the regulator’s 
ability to engage in credible regulatory oversight of an entirely unregulated 
dark market creating risk exposure in the trillions.227  This was directly 
contrary to the original agency oversight purposes envisioned by Congress 
under the CFTA.228 
3. Evaluating the regulator 
The IG issued an audit report covering the period October 2009-
March 2010 evaluating the performance of the CFTC.229  The IG identified 
three “most serious” management challenges: Congressional demand that 
the CFTC and SEC harmonize their regulation of overlapping financial 
products; a decision on the CFTC’s regulatory model for the swaps 
derivatives market; and expansion of CFTC’s regulatory responsibilities 
over the potential carbon emission trading markets.230 
Yet, neither the IG nor the GAO has much to say about the CFTC.  
The agency’s struggle over the last twenty years to take its place in the 
formal regulatory structure was effectively extinguished in 2000 with the 
passage of the Commodities Futures Modernization Act permitting off-
exchange trading that would remain largely unregulated.231  The CFTC’s 
struggle underscores the potency of externality impact on credible 
oversight.  The culprit is arguably Congress.  Not only did Congress refuse 
to heed the CFTC’s warning, it passed affirmative legislation shutting the 
door on any regulation at all. 
4. Reform Act remediation 
The Reform Act authorizes the SEC and the CFTC to form a joint 
 
 225.  Weismann, supra note 29 at 26. 
 226.  ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT, supra note 108.. 
 227.  Id. 
 228.  CFTC ACT, supra note 214. 
 229.  U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, 
Semiannual Report of the Office of the Inspector General (April 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/oigsar033110.pdf. 
 230.  Id. 
 231.  Commodities Future Modernization Act of 2000, H.R. 4541, 106th Cong. (2000). 
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commission to identify emergency issues and regulatory risks, assess their 
implications for market participants and recommend solutions.232  
Modernization of the regulatory infrastructure has begun with the 
expansion of CFTC regulatory authority under the Reform Act, also known 
as “Derivative Markets Transparency and Accountability Act of 2009.”233  
Along with the SEC, the CFTC is authorized to commence rulemaking 
with regard to swaps and the swap related entities and participants.234  
Specifically, the SEC has the authority to regulate security-based swaps.235  
The CFTC now has primary regulatory authority over swaps, the majority 
of the overall market for the over-the-counter derivatives.236  Regulatory 
changes will be recommended to Congress for implementation in the 
derivatives market.237  The agencies will also recommend legislative 
changes to federal insolvency laws.238  The Act further extends the CFTC’s 
authority to regulate derivatives and repeals numerous legislative 
prohibitions.239  Accordingly, the Reform Act continues to maintain a 
parallel system of regulatory authority or functional regulation as part of 
the new plan.240 
Most significantly, the Reform Act repeals the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act prohibition against the regulation of security based swap agreements.241  
The CFTC initiated the rule making process by dividing thirty proposed 
topic areas into eight groups including comprehensive regulation of swap 
dealers and major swap participants; clearing; trading; enforcement; 
position limits; and, others.242 
The expansion of the CFTC’s rulemaking authority does address 
Nier’s factor of sending a stronger mandate to the agency than was 
heretofore characterized by the CFMA, which was enacted to intentionally 
emasculate the agency.243  Despite the current reform mandate, however, 
 
 232.  Reform Act, supra note 12. 
 233.  Derivative Markets Transparency and Accountability Act of 2009, H.R. 977, 111th 
Cong. (2009). 
 234.  Reform Act, supra note 232. 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  Id. 
 237.  Id. 
 238.  Id. 
 239.  Id. 
 240.  Id. 
 241.  Id. 
 242.  Rule Making Areas, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, 
http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/Rulemakings/index.htm. 
 243.  See NIER, supra note 46, at 216 (exploring questions raised by the “strong effort to 
make a new macroprudential orientation operational” in response to the “recognition that 
prior to the global financial crisis financial regulation had lacked a macroprudential 
perspective”). 
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Congress has sent mixed signals to the agency and the private sector 
market participants over the last decade.244  That confusion has interfered 
with information collection and calibration.245 Even the best rules cannot 
quickly overcome the legislative practices of the past. 
Parenthetically, the Congressional Budget Office previously estimated 
that up to 235 additional employees would be needed by the CFTC by 
fiscal year 2011 to regulate central counterparty clearing of swaps.246  This 
estimate required a forty percent increase over existing staffing levels.247  
The estimate provided a window into the sheer magnitude of the agency’s 
new regulatory role under the Reform Act and illustrates the massive 
hurdles faced by the CFTC in its continuing efforts to comply with its new 
obligations without adequate staffing. 
C. Federal Reserve Board 
1. Regulatory Model and Authority 
In 1913, the Federal Reserve System, which serves as the nation’s 
central bank, was created by federal law.248  The law requires that the FRB 
report on at least an annual basis to Congress.249  It provides a list of 
specific responsibilities, which includes: the formulation of monetary 
policy; setting the discount rate; regulating and supervising member banks; 
suspending, liquidating or restructuring troubled banking institutions; and 
setting standards for reserve requirements and worthless assets.250  The 
Federal Reserve shares functional supervisory and regulatory 
responsibilities for domestic banking institutions with the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
and the Office of Thrift Supervision, now merged into the OCC.251  Banks 
are often owned or controlled by bank holding companies.252  Here, the 
 
 244.  Id. 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  GARY GENSLER, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, INSPECTOR 
GENERAL’S FISCAL YEAR 2009 ASSESSMENT (Nov. 16, 2009),  
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/oigmgmtchall2009.pdf. 
 247.  Id. 
 248.  Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 113-31, § 226, 38 Stat. 251 (1913), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/section1.htm. 
 249.  Id. 
 250.  Id. 
 251.  BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
SYSTEM: PURPOSE AND FUNCTIONS 59  (9th ed., 2005), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf. 
 252.  Id. 
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FRB has supervisory authority for all bank holding companies, regardless 
of whether the subsidiary bank of the holding company is a national bank, 
state member bank, or state nonmember bank.253 
The history of the FRB rulemaking authority illustrates the point made 
earlier – that the regulatory authority of federal agencies is limited to the 
investiture of express powers by Congress and where the agency attempts 
to expand its supervisory power, even in the interests of preventing a 
societal harm caused by increased systemic risk, it will be prohibited from 
doing so.254  This may result in a regulatory gap that hinders credible 
regulatory oversight.255  Case in point: In 1986, the Supreme Court struck 
down a federal regulation promulgated by the FRB under the Bank Holding 
Company Act, which gave the Board regulatory authority to supervise 
nonbank financial institutions offering the “functional equivalent” of 
banking services provided to customers by banks.256  The Court observed 
that the Act gave a simple and broad definition of a bank as “any national 
banking association or any State bank, savings bank, or trust company” and 
exempted from regulation all institutions that did not engage in the 
business of making commercial loans.257  The message was clear: all other 
nonbank financial institutions not included in the statutory definition were 
simply outside of the FRB’s rulemaking authority.258  Thus, insurance 
institutions providing functionally equivalent banking services, like AIG, 
escaped FRB oversight.259  By virtue of the passage of the Reform Act, the 
statute was not expanded to permit nonbank financial companies to come 
within the regulatory purview of the FRB until after the AIG debacle.260 
2. Evaluating the Regulator 
The FRB was one of the federal agencies not technically subject to the 
audit and reporting requirements of the GPRA.261 Nonetheless, it chose to 
voluntarily comply with the Act.  In any case, the Reform Act now requires 
a special audit by the GAO of “FRB governance.”262  Specifically, the 
 
 253.  Id. 
 254.  Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp. et. al., 474 U.S. 
361 (1986). 
 255.  Id. 
 256.  Id. 
 257.  Id. 
 258.  Id. 
 259.  Id. 
 260.  See Reform Act, supra note 12. 
 261.  FED. RESERVE BOARD, 2011 GPRA PERFORMANCE REPORT 1 (2011), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/gpra/files/2011-gpra-performance-report.pdf. 
 262.  Id. 
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auditors must determine the extent to which FRB governance adequately 
represents the public and whether there are any conflicts of interest when 
member banks elect the members of the FRB.263 
A recent IG Report for the period April 1, 2010 through September 
30, 2010 omits any reference to public criticism that FRB economic policy 
may have fueled the current economic crisis.264  Yet, many others have 
criticized the Board, including the FCIC, for facilitating the credit crisis 
through its promulgation of loose monetary policy and low interest rates in 
the period post 9/11, which was characterized by the undetected corporate 
failures of Enron and WorldCom.265 As a consequence, the financial system 
was flooded with available cash.266  Banks, mortgage companies, 
institutional investors, and the unregulated hedge funds engaged in 
increased risk to generate ever higher returns in a weak dollar/low interest 
rate/cheap asset environment.267  Notably, the Board also opposed 
regulation of derivatives in opposition to the demands of another federal 
agency, the CFTC.268  Thus, lax economic policy combined with limited 
regulatory authority over nonbank financial institutions has fueled the 
claim that the Board failed to act in the public interest.  More recently, the 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report, released on January 27, 2011, 
targeted the FRB for its failure to avert the crisis: “The prime example is 
the Federal Reserve’s pivotal failure to stem the flow of toxic mortgages, 
which it could have done by setting prudent mortgage-lending standards.  
The Federal Reserve was the one entity empowered to do so and it did 
not.”269 
The GAO report issued in January 2009 provided a different twist 
regarding the perceived failure of financial regulatory oversight.270  It is not 
so much a critique of the FRB, or any other federal regulator for that 
matter, but instead focuses on the absence of macroprudential coordination 
between regulatory agencies and the externalities that impede credible 
 
 263.  Id. 
 264.  See Semiannual Report of the Office of the Inspector General, supra note 229. 
 265.   Id. 
 266.  See Bodine, supra note 81 (commenting on the subprime mortgage crisis). 
 267.  Id. 
 268.  Concerning Regulation of the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market 
and Hybrid Instruments: House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs. (July 24, 1998) 
(testimony of Richard R. Lindsey, Director, Division of Market Regulation, Securities and 
Exchange Commission), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testarchive/1998/tsty0898.htm#body4. 
 269.  THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT OF THE NAT’L COMM. ON THE 
CAUSES OF THE FIN. AND ECON. CRISIS IN THE U.S. (2011), available at 
http://www.fcic.gov/report. 
 270.  ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT, supra note 108. 
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regulatory oversight.271  Those externalities include the “too big to fail” 
scenario that characterized the collapse of AIG, the demise of the 
investment bank model where investment banks utilized publicly traded 
holding companies with broker-dealer subsidiaries dealing in largely 
unregulated markets due to the regulatory gaps created by the GLBA, and 
the failure of the private sector to self-regulate and exercise restraint.272  In 
short, the GAO report describes a runaway market not subject to sound 
regulation and able to evade oversight.273 
3. Reform Act Remediation 
During congressional hearings in 2008, FRB officials acknowledged a 
failure of big picture regulatory supervision.274  It observed that under the 
pre-Reform Act regulatory structure consisting of multiple agencies, 
difficulties can arise in assessing risk profiles of large, complex financial 
institutions which operate across financial sectors, particularly given the 
increased use of sophisticated financial products that can generate risk 
across various entities.275  In addition to the creation of the FSOC under the 
Reform Act to coordinate agency supervision, a newly created position of 
Vice-President of Supervision has been added to the regulatory 
infrastructure.  This requires the FRB to make recommendations to 
Congress regarding the supervision and regulation of financial 
institutions.276 
Likewise, the solution to the “too big to fail problem,” where the very 
size and nature of the nonbank financial institutions insulated them from 
regulatory oversight and market discipline, may now be a function of 
government regulation.277  Under the Reform Act, the FSOC may subject a 
“US nonbank financial company” to FRB supervision and to “prudential 
standards.”278  The FSOC must first determine by a two-thirds vote, 
including an affirmative vote by the Chairperson, that “material financial 
distress” exists at the nonbank financial company, or the “nature, scope, 
size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of the activities” 
could pose a threat to U.S. financial stability.279  It is important to note that 
 
 271.  Id. 
 272.  Id. 
 273.  Id. 
 274.  Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs: Condition of the Banking 
System, 110th  Congres 2nd Sess. (2008). 
 275.  Id. 
 276.  Id. supra note 252. 
 277.  Id. 
 278.   Id. supra note 252. 
 279.  Id. 
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nonbank financial companies still remain effectively outside of regulatory 
supervision unless the FSOC exercises its discretion as provided for under 
the Act.280  It remains to be seen whether this model will effectively 
remediate the regulatory gap. 
The Reform Act may close the regulatory gap created by Congress’ 
previous intransigence in excluding from FRB oversight large nonbank 
financial institutions, including insurance companies like AIG, even if they 
have no bank or thrift subsidiary.281  Here, the impact of externalities, 
namely Congress and economic policy, undoubtedly impacted credible 
regulatory oversight and the successful implementation of macroprudential 
policy.  The FRB argues that it was doing its job according to its legal 
mandate.282  It simply lacked the authority to effectively supervise systemic 
risk.283 
D. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
1. Regulatory Model and Authority 
The Banking Act of 1933 created the FDIC to administer a federal 
program insuring bank deposits of participating banks.284  As such, the 
FDIC was another regulatory brainchild of the Great Depression.  In 1989, 
with the abolition of the Federal Savings and Loan Corporation (FSLIC), 
the now defunct Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) assumed FSLIC’s 
regulatory function over thrifts.285  With the advent of the Wall Street 
Reform Act, OTS was summarily abolished and the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) assumed the duties of the OTS.286  Thrifts are savings 
and loan financial institutions, primarily engaged in the home mortgage 
business.287  The FDIC provides two oversight functions referred to as 
 
 280.  Id. 
 281.  Id. 
 282.  MARC LABONTE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE SYSTEMIC RISK AND THE 
FEDERAL RESERVE, 6-7 (2009), , 
http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Systemic_Risk_and_the_Federal_Reserve.pdf. 
 283.  Id. 
 284.  The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). 
 285.  Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), 
Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989). 
 286. Id. supra note 251. 
 287.  See generally Steven Pilloff & Robin Prager, Thrift Involvement in Commercial 
and Industrial Lending, FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN, Dec. 1998, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/1998/199812lead.pdf (considering the weight 
that should be given to thrift institutions as actual or potential competitors of commercial 
banks in providing financial services). 
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primary and “backup” or secondary oversight.288  The FDIC is responsible 
for primary oversight of any state-chartered bank that is not a member of 
the Federal Reserve System.289  In this capacity, it serves as the primary 
federal regulator for over 5,200 state-chartered institutions.290  Similar to 
other insurers, the FDIC monitors and assesses risks at all insured financial 
institutions and determines each institution’s insurance risk category and 
premium rate.291  The FDIC regulations then assign each risk category a 
specific insurance assessment rate that is used to compute an institution’s 
insurance premium, which is added to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF).292 
The FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) required the FDIC to 
establish a risk-based assessment system.293  A risk-based system is one 
based on an institution’s probability of causing a loss to the DIF due to the 
composition and concentration of the institution’s assets and liabilities, the 
amount of loss given failure, and the revenue needs of the fund.294  To 
implement that requirement, the FDIC categorized institutions into risk 
categories based on two regulatory criterion: (1) capital levels; and, (2) 
supervisory ratings as calculated by the primary regulatory agency sharing 
functional oversight of the institution.295  With the passage of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005 and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Reform Act Conforming Amendments of 2005, the FDIC was statutorily 
required to set institutional risk assessments semiannually.296  The new 
provisions continued to require that the assessment system be risk-based, 
however, risk was more broadly defined.297  Yet, the integrity of the 
FDIC’s oversight evaluation still rested upon the supervisory ratings 
calculated by the primary regulatory agency. 
 
 288.  See generally EDWARD MURPHY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, WHO 
REGULATES WHOM AND HOW? AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY POLICY FOR 
BANKING AND SECURITIES MARKETS, , (2013) http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43087.pdf 
[hereinafter MURPHY] (breaking down the regulation scheme of banks and securities 
markets). 
 289.  Id. 
 290.  2013 Annual Performance Plan: Insurance Program, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 
available at http://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/performance/insurance.html. 
 291.  Id. 
 292.  Id. 
 293.  FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified at 
12 U.S.C. § 1811). 
 294.  Reform of Deposit Insurance, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. 
http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/reform.html#rbas. 
 295.  MURPHY, supra note 288. 
 296.  Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 110 Stat. 9 
(2005); Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act Conforming Amendments of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109-173, 119 Stat. 3601 (2005). 
 297.  Id. 
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The focus here is on the secondary or backup examination and 
enforcement authority of the FDIC over all of the institutions it insures in 
order to prevent or mitigate losses to deposit insurance funds.  It is here 
where the FDIC’s regulatory authority has been most limited.  This 
explains, in large measure, the reasons that the FDIC was unable to 
effectively prevent major bank failures during the recent financial crisis as 
a result of these regulatory restrictions.  As the word back-up implies, the 
bank in question has a primary regulator other than the FDIC in charge of 
examination and supervision.  This is part of the system of functional 
regulation.  Along with the primary regulator, the FDIC as the insurer has 
authority to perform its own examination of a federally insured bank and 
impose enforcement actions to protect the DIF, provided statutory and 
regulatory procedures are followed.298 
Parenthetically, the interagency agreement between the FDIC and the 
primary regulator was “intended to balance the needs of FDIC against the 
regulatory burden on an institution of having two regulators duplicating 
examinations.”299  Another critical aspect of the interagency “agreement is 
that the FDIC must rely, “to the fullest extent possible, on the work of the 
primary regulator.”300  Additionally, “the terms of the interagency 
agreement governing information sharing and back-up examinations 
require that the FDIC prove a requisite level of risk at an institution – 
heightened risk, material deteriorating conditions, or adverse developments 
– in order for the primary regulator to grant the FDIC access to the 
institution’s information.”301  Accordingly, where the primary regulator is 
not doing its job, the FDIC must still establish the requisite level of risk to 
obtain access to critical internal information.302  Strangely, that access is 
limited to the audit results of the primary regulator that has failed to do its 
job in the first instance.303  A clear breakdown under Nier’s model of 
information gathering and calibration. 
This regulatory paradigm was reviewed in detail by the IG during its 
audit of the FDIC and the OTS in its “evaluation of the federal regulatory 
oversight” immediately preceding the failure of Washington Mutual Bank 
 
 298.  MURPHY, supra note 288. 
 299.  Role of Regulators Exercising Their Supervision of Washington Mutual Bank from 
2004-2008: Hearing Before the Perm. Sen. Subcomm. on Investigations Comm. On 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, (2010) (statement of John Rymer, Inspector 
General, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation). 
 300.  Id. 
 301.  OFFICES OF THE INSPECTOR  GENERAL,  U.S.  DEP’T OF THE TREASURY FED. DEPOSIT 
INS. CORP., EVAL-10-002, EVALUATION OF REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF WASHINGTON 
MUTUAL BANK (2010), http://www.fdicoig.gov/reports10/Eval-10-002-508.shtml. 
 302.  Id. 
 303.  Id. 
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(WaMu).  The IG concluded that the procedures governing the FDIC’s 
backup authority were unduly restrictive and prevented the FDIC from 
adequately performing its regulatory function.304  An absence of “big 
picture” focus contributed to a regulatory gap.305 
2. Recent oversight initiatives 
The story of the failure of Washington Mutual (WaMu) perhaps best 
illustrates the importance of macroprudential regulation.306  The failure of 
FDIC oversight initiatives as a result of regulatory compartmentalization 
supports the IG’s conclusion that the FDIC’s hands were tied by 
regulations which prevented it from effectively doing its job of credible 
regulatory oversight and preventing WaMu’s downfall.307 
WaMu’s primary federal regulator was the OTS.308  As such, OTS was 
responsible for conducting full-scope examinations to assess WaMu’s 
safety and soundness and compliance with consumer protection laws.309  
Unfortunately, OTS relied in large measure on WaMu’s own internal audit 
system to track the thrift’s progress.310  Parenthetically, the reliance on the 
private sector’s own judgment effectively replaced the independent role of 
the primary regulator.311  Later facts revealed that WaMu’s management 
pursued an unreasonably high-risk lending strategy to enable it to compete 
with its main competitor, Countrywide Mortgage, one of the first major 
lenders to fail in the string of mortgage company failures to follow.312  
WaMu’s strategy included liberal underwriting standards and inadequate 
risk controls.313  That high-risk strategy combined with the housing and 
mortgage market collapse in mid-2007 left WaMu with loan losses, 
borrowing capacity limitations, and a falling stock price.314  To compound 
the problems, in Fall 2008, depositors made a run on the bank and 
withdrew significant funds after WaMu’s problems were made public.315  
Thereafter, WaMu was unable to raise capital to cover depositor 
withdrawals, forcing the OTS to close the institution on September 25, 
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 315.  Id. 
WEISMANN, PETERSON, AND BUSCAGLIA_FINAL (ARTICLE 2).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/28/2014  2:31 PM 
2014] THE NEW MACROPRUDENTIAL REFORM PARADIGM 1073 
 
2008.316 
The IG concluded that the FDIC properly conducted its required 
monitoring of WaMu from 2003 to 2008.317  As a result of this monitoring, 
the FDIC identified risks with WaMu’s lending strategy and internal 
controls.318  However, the risks noted in the FDIC’s monitoring reports did 
not result in an increase in WaMu’s deposit insurance premium 
payments.319  This discrepancy occurred because the deposit insurance 
regulations rely on the safety and soundness ratings and regulatory capital 
levels determined by the primary regulator to gauge risk and assess related 
deposit insurance premiums, in this case the OTS.320  Since the OTS 
examination results were satisfactory, based upon OTS’ misguided reliance 
on WaMu’s own tracking system, increases in deposit insurance premiums 
were not triggered.321 
3. Evaluating the regulator 
The IG concluded that the interagency agreement did not provide the 
FDIC with the access to information that it needed to assess WaMu’s risk 
to the DIF.322  Additionally, it found that the interagency agreement then in 
effect did not allow the FDIC sufficient flexibility to obtain information 
necessary to assess risk in order to protect the DIF.323  Finally, the IG also 
concluded that FDIC deposit insurance regulations are too restrictive in 
prescribing the information used to assign an institution’s insurance 
category and premium rate.324  In short, the regulatory paradigm designed 
by Congress failed to achieve the intended goal of credible regulatory 
oversight. 
4. Reform Act remediation 
As a consequence of the WaMu failure, the OTS was dissolved and 
merged into the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the duties 
were then split between the OCC and the FDIC.325  Additionally, the 
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 325.  OTS Integration, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, 
http://www.occ.gov/about/who-we-are/occ-for-you/bankers/ots-integration.html. 
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Reform Act now includes the Dissolution Authority for Large, 
Interconnected Companies Act of 2009.326  Under this Act, the FDIC is 
authorized to make a written recommendation regarding systemic risk to 
U.S. economic stability posed by a financial institution in default or in 
danger of default.327  Remarkably, at that point, the FDIC may be appointed 
as a receiver of a financial institution for a one-year period to take “certain 
discretionary actions to stabilize or dissolve the institution.”328 
CONCLUSION: CAN MACROPRUDENTIAL REFORMS WORK? 
Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke argues that “a macroprudential 
approach would complement and build on the current regulatory and 
supervisory structure, in which the primary focus is the safety and 
soundness of individual institutions and markets.”329  However, there are 
two problems that must be overcome before accepting this argument as a 
proven assumption. 
First, the existing regulatory and supervisory infrastructure failed to 
demonstrate the ability to forecast, much less even recognize, the severity 
of systemic risk until it had seized the markets.  By the time regulators, risk 
managers, and central bankers understood that systemic risk had penetrated 
the markets, it had already spread into full-scale global systemic distress.  
In short, there was a failure of credible regulatory oversight. 
Concomitantly, externalities including the legal limits on regulatory 
powers, political interests, private sector self-regulation, regulatory gaps 
and inefficiency in information sharing among competitive federal agencies 
all combined to inject greater complexity into the regulatory system.  The 
failure of regulatory and supervisory oversight results in part from these 
weaknesses illustrated by the analysis of the five federal agencies. 
Second, the regulatory and supervisory infrastructure was incapable of 
reining in the market participants or proposing remedial measures to 
temper the disaster.  Instead, the government sponsored bail-out, described 
as “the most profound system shift over the course of recovery,” resulted in 
the massive transfer of risk from the private institutions to governments and 
central banks.330  Specifically, the bail-out engineered the direct acquisition 
 
 326.  Reform Act, supra note 12.  
 327.  Id. 
 328.  Weismann, supra note 29, at 37. 
 329.  Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Res. Bank, Remarks at the Council on Foreign 
Relations, “Financial Reform to Address Systemic Risk” (March 10, 2009), available at  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090310a.htm. 
 330.  STATE STREET CORP., VISION FOCUS: SYSTEMIC RISK: STRATEGIC CHALLENGES FOR 
POLICY MAKERS AND PRACTIONERS, (2011), 
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of impaired securities, the use of deficit spending to generate economic 
stimulus and the issuance of new liquidity through quantitative easing.331  
In short, the regulatory models designed to ensure that financial institutions 
would remain liquid and insulated from market failure in the event of crisis, 
were useless.  The massive bank failures described above well illustrate 
this point.  In fact, the bail-out strategy fueled by direct government 
intervention wholly circumvented the regulatory process and the 
consequences of natural market forces.  The bail-out arguably incentivizes 
excessive risk taking where market participants escape failure and/or 
regulatory enforcement.  The macroprudential approach, designed to 
embrace both the financial and securities markets, is an untested strategy 
designed to address these problems.  Congress, now in lockstep with the 
regulators, has agreed in principle that some form of broader regulation is 
needed to close regulatory gaps and address other externalities that impact 
oversight in the market.  However, the idea that broader regulation is 
necessary does not necessarily mean more rules.  There will be some new 
rules to penetrate the dark markets – those heretofore unregulated products 
creating black box regulatory gaps in the marketplace.  Yet, certain 
significant aspects of the regulatory infrastructure remain unchanged.  This 
point is critical to understanding the question of ultimate success of 
macroprudential regulation under the new Reform Act. 
Specifically, the model of market self-regulation, embedded in the 
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, will not 
change.  The idea that natural market forces should control the operation of 
the markets and that regulation is an artificial constraint which results in 
market distortion is the governing philosophy of managerial capitalism.  
The regulators are expected to remain relatively detached from the day to 
day affairs of the marketplace, described by former SEC Chairman and 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice William Douglas as the “shot gun behind the 
door” approach: regulators should be ready to intervene when the private 
sector misbehaves.332  This model is aptly characterized as reactive 
regulation to crisis. 
Likewise, functional regulation will also remain in place.  Regulators 
of each agency will continue to protect their own respective turfs and share 
very little of the actual regulatory redrafting, leaving out the FSOC 
 
http://www.statestreet.com/wps/wcm/connect/a862f6804a2d7e3697de9fed29523c35/11-
0002-
2684_VF_SystemicRisk.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CONVERT_TO=url&CACHEID=a862f68
04a2d7e3697de9fed29523c35. 
 331.  Id. at 15. 
 332.  See Douglas, supra note 139 at 82 (summarizing the addresses and statements of 
SEC Chairman Douglas). 
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altogether in the actual rule making process.  The FSOC will remain a 
“looker” rather than a “doer.”  Functional regulation will continue the 
practice of overlapping agency authority based upon the particular financial 
activity as opposed to the industry being regulated. 
What has changed is the recognition that the FSOC must exist to force 
the regulators to sit at the same table and share perceptions about market 
activity so that the possibility of an entire regulatory infrastructure being 
blindsided by the private sector is diminished.  Thus, faith in the system of 
market self-regulation grounded on a functional regulatory infrastructure 
that is highly reactive to market events is a necessary condition precedent 
to concluding that the new system of macroprudential regulation can work. 
The Hanson, Kashyap & Stein study raised the question of whether 
the existing weaknesses in the regulatory system itself can be addressed 
“sensibly.”333  That question cannot be answered simply given the 
complexity of the regulatory system upon which reform rests.  While Nier 
recommends a new and sound taxonomy for the implementation of 
macroprudential policy,334 the theory is somewhat disconnected from the 
actual regulatory infrastructure in place.  Arguably, the current regulatory 
infrastructure does not mesh fully with the proposed taxonomy based on 
intentional legislative design and market realities.  A reassessment of the 
role of regulatory agencies in the private sector may be required before any 
long-term strategic plan can be expected to meet reform expectations.  In 
any case, in a world of private interests and Wall Street domination, it 
would be a long and bitter fight. 
 
 
 333. See Hanson et al., supra, note 22. 
 334. See Nier, supra, note 46. 
